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"NOW OPEN FOR DEVELOPMENT?": THE
PRESENT STATE OF REGULATION OF
ACTIVITIES IN NORTH CAROLINA
WETLANDS
JOSEPH J. KALO*
Regulation of activities altering or destroying isolated freshwater
wetlands is a very controversial topic. Over the past fifteen years,
challenges to both the federal Clean Water Act's section 404
wetlands regulations and state wetlands regulation programs have
intensified. In recent years, although proponents of the programs
have found a sympathetic ear in the administering agencies, the
opponents of such programs are beginning to find a more
receptive judicial audience. At the federal level, on one hand, the
2001 decision of the United States Supreme Court in Solid Waste
Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps
of Engineers (SWANCC) indicates that isolated freshwater
wetlands and waters are not section 404 jurisdictional waters,
leaving such areas beyond the reach of the current law. On the
other hand, within days of the SWANCC decisions, the federal
agencies issued a revised Tulloch rule designed to limit
mechanized landclearing activities in freshwater wetlands,
including isolated ones. At the state level, pending litigation in
North Carolina challenges the validity of the state Environmental
Management Commission's (EMC) wetlands rules. The
uncertainty surrounding the breadth of the holding in SWANCC
and pending state litigation raises serious questions about the
continued protection of many ecologically significant, isolated
North Carolina freshwater wetlands. In this article, Professor
Kalo argues that the SWANCC decision does withdraw isolated
freshwater wetlands from the protections of section 404 and
undermines the objective of the revised Tulloch rule. However,
Professor Kalo concludes that the Environmental Management
Commission has the necessary statutory authority to support its
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this Article.
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wetlands rules and their application to ditching and draining
activities affecting isolated freshwater wetlands within the state.
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 1669
I. THE CONTENTIOUS SECTION 404 WETLANDS PROGRAM ... 1675
A. What are the "Waters of the United States" ...................... 1678
1. Pre-SWANCC Developments ..................................... 1678
2. The Migratory Bird Rule ............................................. 1680
3. The SWANCC Litigation and Decision ..................... 1681
4. The Meaning and Aftermath of SWANCC ............... 1683
a. The Corps' and the EPA's Reaction to
SW A N CC ................................................................. 1683
b. The Broader Message of SWANCC ...................... 1685
B. What Activities in Wetlands Are Subject to Section 404 .. 1693
1. What is a Regulated Discharge?: The Tulloch
R ule ................................................................................ 1693
2. National Mining and the Tulloch Rule ....................... 1695
3. The "New" Tulloch Rule ............................................. 1696
II. NORTH CAROLINA LAW AND ACTIVITIES IN ISOLATED,
NON-NAVIGABLE, FRESHWATER WETLANDS ....................... 1698
A. The History of State Regulation of Activities in
W etlands ............................................................................... 1699
B. EMC's Certification and Enforcement Authority ............ 1701
C. Are Isolated, Freshwater Wetlands "Waters" of the
State? ..................................................................................... 1703
1. Issues Raised as to the Extent of EMC's Authority. 1703
2. The Source of EMC's Authority Over Isolated
W etlands ......................................................................... 1704
3. The Statutory Meaning of "Waters" ........................... 1706
D. The Effect of the Incorporation of Federal Wetlands
Regulations into the EMC Wetlands Rules ....................... 1711
1. Delineation of Wetlands Using Federal Wetlands
Delineation Criteria ...................................................... 1712
2. The Effect of SWANCC Upon the EMC's
W etlands R ules .............................................................. 1714
E. The Proposed EMC Permitting Program for Isolated
W etlands ............................................................................... 1717
F. Other Risks Associated with Ditching and Draining
W etlands ............................................................................... 1721
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 1722
1668 [Vol. 79
2001] NOW OPEN FOR DEVELOPMENT 1669
INTRODUCTION
The principal mechanism of federal regulation of activities
adversely affecting wetlands is section 404 of the Clean Water Act
(CWA),1 which requires a permit from the United States Army Corps
of Engineers (Corps) for any discharges of dredge or fill material into
"waters of the United States."2 Since 1977, freshwater wetlands-the
use, degradation, or destruction of which could affect interstate or
foreign commerce-have been included within the regulatory
definition of "waters of the United States,"3 and the regulatory
definition of what constitutes a discharge has been expanded.' The
regulations promulgated to implement section 404 during that time
have created minimum, national, uniform standards for determining
which activities in wetlands areas are consistent with the protection of
the important ecological functions performed by wetlands.5 In North
Carolina, since 1996, state water quality rules have supplemented the
federal section 404 program, providing an additional layer of
protection for the wetlands resources of the state.6 As a result, the
annual loss of wetlands resources through draining, ditching, filling,
and conversion to other uses has been greatly reduced.7 At the
1. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344-1377 (1994). The Act originally was titled the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act of 1972. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 852 (1972). It was renamed the
Clean Water Act in 1977. Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1567 (1977).
2. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1301(a), 1344, 1362(6), (7), (12), (14), (16) (1994) (providing
authority for the Corps to regulate, through its section 404 permit program, discharges of
dredge and fill activities into waters of the United States).
3. See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 118-37 and accompanying text.
5. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b)(2) (2000) (describing the functions performed by wetlands
that are important to the public interest); 40 C.F.R. § 230.41 (2000) (noting the potential
adverse effects of the discharge of dredge or fill material in wetlands areas).
6. See infra notes 159-67 and accompanying text.
7. Of the estimated original 221 million acres of wetlands in the continental United
States, approximately 100.9 million acres remain. Between 1950 and 1970, the estimated
annual loss was 458,000 acres per year. During the period from 1970 to 1980, after the
passage of the CWA, the estimated annual loss declined to 290,000 acres per year. From
1985 to 1995, when isolated freshwater wetlands were brought within the section 404
program permit requirements, the annual losses were reduced to approximately 117,000
acres per year. THOMAS E. DAHL, STATUs AND TRENDS OF WETLANDS IN THE
COTERMINOUS UNITED STATES, 1986 TO 1997, at 34 (2000), available at http://
wetlands.fws.govlbha/SandT/SandTReport.html (last visited Sept. 9,2001) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review). Wetlands loss in North Carolina is difficult to assess due to
the lack of reliable historical data. At the time of European settlement, North Carolina
contained 7.8 million acres of wetlands. By the mid-1970s, an estimated 5.7 million acres
remained, which is about seventeen percent of the state's land area. Gordon E. Cashin et
al., Wetland Alteration Trends on the North Carolina Coastal Plain, 12 WETLANDS 63, 64
(1992). The general consensus is that there has been a decline in wetlands loss in the state.
Telephone Interview with Derb Carter, Senior Attorney, Southern Environmental Law
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present time, however, regulation of activities adversely affecting
wetlands is in a state of considerable uncertainty in North Carolina
and throughout the nation. This uncertainty is the result of three
circumstances. The first is the recent United States Supreme Court
decision in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC);8 the second is the
continuing challenges to federal regulations defining what activities in
wetlands constitute regulated "discharges"; 9 and the third is litigation
in the North Carolina state courts attacking the assertion of state
authority over the ditching and draining of wetlands. 10
Part II of this Article discusses the federal section 404 regulatory
program and the basis for the assertion of CWA jurisdiction over
activities in isolated freshwater wetlands by the Corps and the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which jointly administer
the section 404 program. The meaning of the phrase "waters of the
United States" and the term "discharge" are examined. 2 Central to
the discussion of "waters of the United States" is the SWANCC
decision, which is discussed in the first half of Part II3 The message
of SWANCC appears to be that isolated, non-navigable, wholly
intrastate waters and wetlands14 are not "waters of the United
Center (May 30,2001).
8. 531 U.S. 159 (2001); see also Derb Carter, Supreme Court Decision Defies
Common Sense and Intent of Congress, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL. (Environmental Law
Institute, Washington, D.C.), Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 7, 15-16 ("The SWANCC decision will
undoubtedly spark widespread litigation to resolve whether a particular water or wetland
is regulated under the Clean Water Act."); David M. Ivester, The Supreme Court Draws a
Line, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL. (Environmental Law Institute, Washington, D.C.), Mar.-
Apr. 2001, at 5, 6 (observing that the issue of which waters are "isolated" will undoubtedly
be the subject of future discussions between landowners and agencies and the focus of
future litigation).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 118-42.
10. For a more detailed history of the promulgation of, and litigation surrounding, the
state wetland rules, see infra text accompanying notes 164-216.
11. Because the Corps and the EPA both have regulatory roles under Section 404 of
the CWA, the Corps jurisdictional regulations parallel the EPA regulations. For example,
40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(3) is the corresponding EPA regulation to 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3), the
Corps regulation at issue in SWANCC. In this Article, the discussion of the effect of
judicial decisions on Corps regulations is equally applicable to the parallel EPA
regulations.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 44-149.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 64-117.
14. As used in this Article, "isolated" means open freshwaters or wetlands that lack a
surface hydrological connection to other waters that are part of, or adjacent to, interstate
waters or navigable-in-fact waters or a tributary system of either. "Non-navigable" means
that the waters are not navigable-in-fact. "Wholly intrastate" means that all of the body or
water or wetland lies within the boundaries of a single state.
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States."15  Such a narrow interpretation of "waters of the United
States" jeopardizes the section 404 program and the gains in wetlands
protection achieved over the past twenty-five years. 6 Such an
interpretation would leave outside the protection of the CWA many
ecologically significant freshwater wetlands and small open water
ponds. These freshwater wetlands and ponds are isolated, non-
navigable, wholly intrastate wetlands and waters and would be
beyond the regulatory authority granted to the Corps and the EPA by
the CWA.
Section 404 regulatory authority hinges not only on whether the
area is part of the "waters of the United States," but also upon
whether the particular activity is a "discharge." If either of the two
elements is absent, the activity is not subject to section 404 regulatory
requirements. Wetlands losses resulting from large-scale mechanized
landclearing, ditching, and draining activities aimed at converting
wetlands to tree plantations,'17 soybean farms,18  golf courses,19
15. See infra text accompanying notes 84-116.
16. The reasoning and result in SWANCC is already being attacked in the
environmentalist community. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 8, at 7 (arguing that SWANCC
reverses "nearly a quarter of a century of fairly settled law that Clean Water Act
protection extends to. . . 'isolated' waters and wetlands"); Robin Kundis Craig, Navigating
Federalism: The Missing Statutory Analysis in Solid Waste Agency, 31 ENvTL. L. REP.
10,508, 10,510 (2001) (noting that the Supreme Court in SWANCC contradicted
congressional intent and ignored Congress's "complex but rational scheme for dividing
state and federal regulatory authority to protect the nation's waters"); Robert G. Dreher,
Unsettling the Balance of Federalism: The SWANCC Decision, NAT'L WETLANDS
NEWSL. (Environmental Law Institute, Washington, D.C.), Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 1
("SWANCC upset[s] almost 30 years of cooperative effort between federal and state
governments to protect the nation's aquatic resources... [and throws] open a large part of
the nation's most sensitive and valuable aquatic habitat to unfettered development.");
Patrick Parenteau, Our Wetlands Dominoes, NAT'L LJ., Feb. 26, 2001, at A18 ("[T]his
result-oriented decision is simply the latest example of the conservative majority's single-
minded determination to 'reign in' the power of the federal government whenever the
opportunity presents itself, regardless of precedent, principle or public policy."); Herman
Schwartz, An Out-of-Control Court, THE NATION, Mar. 26, 2001, at 6 (commenting that
the "Supreme Court's conservative bloc seems determined to continue using its one-vote
majority to ram through an assault on Congressional power").
17. Brian Feagans, Restoration; Regulators Slowly Restoring Once Violated Wetlands,
MORNING STAR (Wilmington, N.C.), Aug. 28, 1999, at 1A.
18. See, e.g., Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 929 (5th Cir.
1983) (applying section 404 of the CWA to large-scale landclearing operations). The
Avoyelles litigation concerned a large-scale landclearing operation intended to convert a
20,000-acre tract of land into soybean production. Most of the acreage consisted of
forested wetlands. Avoyelles held that such large-scale landclearing operations were
subject to the regulatory requirements of section 404 of the CWA. In the 1960s and 1970s,
prior to the Avoyelles decision, large areas of cypress swamp in Louisiana's Atchafalaya
Basin were cleared and converted into soybean production. Many of these soybean
operations proved unprofitable, however, and the fields were later abandoned. The state
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subdivisions,2 ° or other uses have long been a concern of
environmental groups and others.21 With modern technology, this can
frequently be accomplished with only small amounts of the removed
soil and vegetation falling back into the wetland area.' These small
amounts of soil falling back are referred to as "incidental fallback."
and federal governments are purchasing the abandoned fields and returning them to high-
quality wetlands. See Bob Anderson, Atchafalaya Wetlands Restoration Planned, BATON
ROUGE ADVOc., Feb. 16,1995, at lB.
19. See, e.g., United States Army Corps of Engineers, Review and Findings: Old
Cutler Bay Permit 404(q) Elevation (Sept. 13, 1990) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review). This permit elevation decision concerned the application of the practical
alternatives of the EPA section 404 guidelines. The 357-acre project, located next to
Biscayne National Park, involved the construction of 428 upscale single-family dwellings
and an eighteen-hole golf course designed by Jack Nicklaus. To build the golf course, the
developer planned to fill fifty-nine acres of wetlands, including twelve acres of white
mangrove swamp. The project eventually was allowed to proceed after the developer
agreed not to fill eight acres of the mangrove swamp. See Agencies Protest Plan to Fill
Wetlands, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 5, 1990, at 4B; David Conyers, Developer Agrees
to Avoid Mangroves, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 27, 1990, at 4B; EPA Puts Hold on
Wetlands Fill, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 7, 1990, at 7B. See also Editorial, Tale From
the Swamp, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 15, 2000, at A22 (describing
pressure to drain eastern North Carolina wetlands for housing and golf course projects).
20. See, e.g., Scott Harper, EPA Cites 10 Local Projects for Destroying Wetlands,
VIRGINIAN PILOT AND LEDGER-STAR (Norfolk, Va.), May 9, 2000, at Al (reporting the
draining of wetlands for subdivisions in Virginia); see also Editorial, Tale From the Swamp,
supra note 19 (describing the threat to wetlands from new development). A controversial
topic was Nationwide Permit 26, which authorized the filling of small amounts of wetlands.
Nationwide Permit 26 was allowed to expire in June 2000. Its replacement, Nationwide
Permit 39, is much more restrictive. The National Association of Home Builders
vigorously opposed the change. See, e.g., Bill Sapp, Nationwide Permit 26: Replaced or
Eliminated?, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL. (Environmental Law Institute, Washington,
D.C.), Mar.-Apr. 2000, at 1, 13 (describing the environmental concerns raised by
Nationwide Permit 26 and comparing it to the new Nationwide Permit 39, its more
restrictive and complicated replacement).
21. Much of the litigation which resulted in the expansion of the section 404 program
was initiated by environmental organizations and citizens groups. For example, the
Tulloch rule was adopted in response to citizen-initiated litigation, see Am. Mining Cong.
v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 951 F. Supp. 267, 269 (D.D.C. 1997), and the
Avoyelles litigation was initiated by environmental groups. See Avoyelles, 715 F.2d at 901,
n.5. The original Tulloch rule stated that "[t]he term discharge of dredged material means
... any addition, including any redeposit, of dredged material, including excavated
material, into the waters of the United States, which is incidental to any activity, including
mechanized landclearing." 33 C.F.R. § 323.2 (2000) (emphasis added). The practical
effect of the Tulloch rule was to require a section 404 permit for any large-scale
landclearing operation in wetlands or other waters of the United States, because it would
be almost impossible to remove soil and vegetation from wetlands areas without some soil
or vegetation falling off the removal equipment back into the wetland area. Such fallback
would be regarded as a redeposit. Am. Mining, 951 F. Supp. at 270, n.3. The EPA
promulgated a parallel rule, which was codified at 40 C.F.R. § 232.2(1)(iii) (2000).
22. Am. Mining, 951 F. Supp. at 269.
23. 33 C.F.R. § 232.2(d)(2)(II) (2000) defines incidental fallback as "the redeposit of
small volumes of dredged material that is incidental to excavation activity in waters of the
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Eight days after the SWANCC decision, the Corps and the EPA
issued a new, final regulation modifying the definition of "discharge
of dredged material."24 The new regulation attempts to continue to
assert section 404 jurisdiction over large-scale mechanized
landclearing activities while responding to the ruling in National
Mining Association v. United States Army Corps of Engineers25 that
incidental falback is not a "discharge" subject to section 404
regulation.26 The new regulation states that the use of mechanized
earth-moving equipment to conduct landclearing, ditching, or other
mechanized excavation activities in waters of the United States is
presumed to result in a prohibited discharge absent project-specific
evidence showing that the activity results in only incidental fallback 7
Not surprisingly, homebuilders, mining companies, and farmers
immediately challenged the new regulation as inconsistent with the
decision in National Mining."5 The second half of Part II discusses the
new regulation, its background, and its relationship to the SWANCC
decision.29
Achieving the goal of this new regulation may be frustrated by
SWANCC. To the extent that isolated waters and wetlands are no
longer part of the "waters of the United States," the nature and
extent of the activity is irrelevant. If such waters and wetlands are no
longer section 404 jurisdictional wetlands, the Corps and the EPA
have no regulatory authority over such activities.
Despite the prospect of losing federal regulatory protection,
isolated, non-navigable, wholly intrastate waters and wetlands may
still be protected by state law in North Carolina and some other
states. ° When SWANCC was decided, the North Carolina regulatory
United States when such material falls back to substantially the same place as the initial
removal."
24. Further Revisions to the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of "Discharge of
Dredged Material," 66 Fed. Reg. 4550,4550 (Jan. 17,2001) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt.
323).
25. 145 F.3d 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
26. National Mining, 145 F.3d at 1401.
27. Further Revisions to the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of "Discharge of
Dredged Material," 66 Fed. Reg. 4550, 4575 (Jan. 17, 2001) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt.
323).
28. See Am. Mining Cong. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 120 F. Supp. 2d 23
(D.D.C. 2000).
29. See infra text accompanying notes 118-49.
30. In thirty-five states, wetlands regulatory programs are limited or non-existent. Jon
Kunsler, The SWANCC Decision and the States-Fill in the Gaps or Declare Open
Season?, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL. (Environmental Law Institute, Washington, D.C.),
Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 9, 9-10. Many of the state programs are tied to the state water quality
certification requirement of section 401 of the CWA. But section 401 certification is
2001] 1673
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scheme did not require state permits for activities that involve
ditching and draining of wetlands; however, such activities had to
meet state water quality standards31 established by the North Carolina
Environmental Management Commission (EMC), the entity charged
with that responsibility under state law.32 Following the SWANCC
decision, the question arose as to whether EMC's water quality
standards continued to apply to isolated, non-navigable, freshwater
wetlands. In the EMC's rules, its definition of "wetlands"
incorporated the federal definition of wetlands that was the subject of
SWANCC.33  If such wetlands may no longer be section 404
jurisdictional wetlands, then arguably such wetlands are no longer
North Carolina jurisdictional wetlands, either. 4 In May 2001, the
EMC responded that its interpretation of its rules was that they
incorporate the federal definition of wetlands as understood at the
time the rules were adopted in 1996.31 At its July 2001 meeting, the
EMC's water quality committee unanimously approved a new rule
that would create a permit program for discharges into certain
isolated waters and isolated wetlands.3 6 The rule, however, will not
be sent to the full EMC for consideration until its September meeting,
triggered by permit applications under section 404 of the CWA. If a section 404 permit is
not required, a section 401 state certification is not required. Therefore, if a state limits
the scope of its wetlands regulatory program to providing required section 401
certifications, and SWANCC removes isolated, non-navigable, wholly intrastate waters
and wetlands from the section 404 regulatory program, the result is that there will be no
regulation of such wetlands in that state. Id. For the discussion of the relationship
between section 401 of the CWA and North Carolina's regulation of activities in wetlands,
see infra notes 159-67 and accompanying text.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 166-67.
32. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-212(2), 143-214.1(a), 143-215 (1999).
33. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2B.0202(71) (Jan. 2001).
34. On April 12,2001, the EMC issued an interpretative ruling that water quality and
wetlands standards apply to isolated wetlands that may be excluded from federal
jurisdiction as a result of SWANCC. North Carolina Environmental Management
Commission, Apr. 12,2001 (minutes of meeting), at 8-11 (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review) [hereinafter EMC Meeting]. However, that interpretation is being
challenged. See infra notes 165-66 and accompanying text. See also James Eli Shiffer,
State Will Stick to Wetlands-Protection Policy, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr.
13, 2001, at 3A (reporting North Carolina's policy of continuing to prevent draining of a
broad range of wetlands despite the SWANCC decision).
35. EMC Meeting, supra note 34, at 8-11.
36. See Agenda for Water Quality Committee, July 11, 2001, available at http://
h20.enr.state.us/adminlemc/committees/wq/2001/index2OOl.htm (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review). The new rules would apply to filling in or draining isolated
wetlands larger than one-third of an acre east of Interstate 95 (the coastal plain) and
greater than one-tenth of an acre west of Interstate 95 (the Piedmont and Mountain
regions). Id.
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by which time the composition of the commission will have changed.
3 7
Therefore, the prospects for adoption of the rule are uncertain.
These state efforts to protect isolated wetlands, however, have
not gone unchallenged. Just as federal authority over such areas has
been challenged, so has the authority of the EMC. Home builders
and some landowners claim that the EMC lacks the statutory
authority to create and enforce water quality standards applicable to
all isolated wetlands3 8 If this contention is correct, then ecologically
significant wetlands are outside the protection of both state and
federal regulatory schemes. Part III of this Article evaluates this
contention and concludes that a reasonable interpretation of existing
state law supports continued state regulatory authority over isolated,
non-navigable, freshwater wetlands. Part III also examines the
existing EMC wetlands rules, the proposed changes, and the issues
surrounding each.
I. THE CONTENTIOUS SECTION 404 WETLANDS PROGRAM
Section 404 is, and has long been, a controversial piece of
legislation. 9 The major controversies involve two issues. The first is
37. Brian Feagans, Environmentalists Fail to Push Wetlands Rules Through,
MORNING-STAR (Wilmington, N.C.), July 12,2001, at 1A.
38. In re Request for Declaratory Ruling by Environmental Management
Commission, No. 99-11706 (Wake County Superior Court filed Nov. 3, 1999). The
litigation filed by the North Carolina Home Builders and other organizations raises a
number of substantive and procedural challenges to a set of EMC rules governing
wetlands, which are referred to as the Wetland Rules. These rules define "wetlands,"
create a wetlands evaluation procedure, assign "existing uses" and water quality standards
to wetlands, and set forth mandatory mitigation ratios for certain projects. See N.C.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2B.0202(64) (Jan. 2001); N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r.
2B.0103(c) (Jan. 2001); N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2B.0201(f) (Jan. 2001); N.C.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2H.0506(b) (Jan. 2001). A number of the issues raised are
beyond the scope of this article. This article addresses only the issue of whether the EMC
has the statutory authority to issue rules for "wetlands" as defined in title 15A, rule
2B.0202(64) of the North Carolina Administrative Code. See infra text accompanying
notes 165-241. With respect to that question, the petitioners assert:
The General Assembly has never granted to the EMC the authority to
promulgate the Wetland Rules .... Since the sweeping definition adopted by
EMC may include areas far from surface waters and may be saturated only
seasonally the EMC seeks to regulate activities wholly unrelated to the
preservation of water quality standards in surface waters.
Petitioner's Brief in Support of Petition for Judicial Review at 2-6, In re Request for
Declaratory Ruling by the Environmental Management Commission, No. 99-11706 (Wake
County Superior Court filed Aug. 3, 2000) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
39. Oliver A. Houck & Michael Rolland, Federalism in Wetlands Regulation: A
Consideration of Delegation of Clean Water Act Section 404 and Related Programs to the
States, 54 MD. L. REv. 1242, 1243 (1995) ("Wetlands regulation may be the most
controversial issue in environmental law. It pits America's most biologically-productive
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and most rapidly-diminishing ecosystems against fights of private ownership and property
development.").
Since the inception of the section 404 program, opponents and supporters of the
program have waged a seemingly interminable war in Congress. See, e.g., Sam Kalen,
Commerce to Conservation: The Call For A National Water Policy And The Evolution of
Federal Jurisdiction Over Wetlands, 69 N.D. L. REv. 873, 898 (1993) (describing attempts
in 1977 to pass legislation limiting the Corps' CWA section 404 authority to traditional
navigable waters and adjacent wetlands); Wetlands Stewardship Act of 1991, H.R. 2400,
101st Cong. (1991) (attempting to legislate a no-net-loss-of-wetlands policy). Battles also
have ensued before the agencies. See, e.g., Section 404 Program Critics Call for Reform,
LAND LETTER, Mar. 1, 1991, at 10 (reporting the 1989 activities of the Nationwide Public
Projects Coalition, which was seeking changes to the manner in which waters projects and
other public works are evaluated under section 404, and describing lobbying by a group of
fifty-four firms seeking a less restrictive 404 program).
On one hand, environmentalists and other concerned groups have successfully
challenged regulations perceived as too narrow in their scope, forcing the Corps and EPA
to write more expansive ones. In the landmark case of National Resources Defense
Council v. Calloway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975), the court ordered the Corps to
rewrite its narrow 1973 CWA section 404 regulations and include within "waters of the
United States" non-navigable streams flowing into navigable waters, wetlands along
navigable waters, wetlands at the headwaters of navigable waters, and isolated wetlands.
See, e.g., Kalen, supra, at 892-97 (describing the background of the challenge to the
narrowly drawn 1975 Corps regulations and the subsequent promulgation of the 1977
regulations expanding the definition of "waters of the United States").
On the other hand, opponents have attempted to chip away at the breadth of the
section 404 program through litigation and sponsoring legislation and restrictive
regulatory proposals. See, e.g., H.R. 2400, supra. Among other changes, this bill would
have classified wetlands as Type A, Type B, or Type C wetlands. No permit would be
required for activities in Type C wetlands. Id. Passage of this act would have resulted in
major changes to the section 404 program. While expressly expanding section 404's
jurisdiction to include drainage, excavation, and removal of vegetation, the bill would have
stripped EPA of any role in the section 404 program, eliminated EPA's veto power and
the EPA's section 404(b)(1) guidelines, and it would have introduced a wetlands
classification system under which some wetlands would be entitled to more protection
than others. See, e.g., Jan Goldman-Carter, The Misguided Call For Reform, NAT'L
WETLANDS NEWSL. (Environmental Law Institute, Washington, D.C.), Jan-Feb. 1996, at
1, 7 ("[T]he calls for Section 404 'reform' emanate mostly from developers and extractive
industries .... Under the guise of reform, the developer, extractive industry, and
agriculture groups are seeking exemptions from Section 404 regulation."). The many
fronts on which these battles have taken place include (1) the meaning of "waters of the
United States," (2) the criteria used to determine whether an area is a wetland and how
the boundaries of a wetland are to be delineated, and (3) the determination of what the
phrase "discharge of a pollutant" means when the subject activity is taking place in a
jurisdictional wetland which, at the time the activity is taking place, is devoid of water.
Congressional hearings have been held, public relations campaigns mounted, and lawsuits
filed. And, of course, a broad interpretation of SWANCC would mean that the twenty-
five-year-old Calloway decision, explained above, has been overruled in part.
Property owners have also attacked section 404 wetlands regulations as violating
the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The claim is that the wetland
regulations are unconstitutional takings of private property without just compensation. In
most of the litigation, such claims have been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Ciampitti v. United
States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310, 311 (1990) (finding no taking); Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657
F.2d 1184, 1185 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (same); Jentgen v. Unites States, 657 F.2d. 1210, 1211 (Ct.
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what areas are "waters of the United States," and the second is what
activities are regulated "discharges." Fueling these controversies is
the belief of some that when making these determinations, the EPA
and the Corps exceeded their legislative mandate. According to
opponents of the current section 404 program, the purpose of the
Clean Water Act is to improve and maintain water quality by
restricting the discharge of pollutants into the waters of the United
States.40 But it is contended that, under the guise of protecting water
quality, the section 404 program is being used to protect small,
isolated, non-navigable, wholly intrastate bodies of freshwater and
isolated, wholly intrastate freshwater wetlands, and the wildlife using
these areas, under circumstances that have little to do with either
interstate commerce or water quality.41 The opponents further argue
that even if Congress intended to regulate activities in such areas, it
lacks the power to do so under the Commerce Clause.4 2 Until
recently, those in favor of an expansive section 404 program have
generally prevailed.43 With one sweep of its judicial hand, however,
the United States Supreme Court in SWANCC may have totally upset
Cl. 1981) (same). But see, e.g., Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 37,40 (1994) (finding a
taking); Formanek v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 332, 333 (1992) (same); Loveladies Harbor,
Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 153 (1990), affd, 28 F.3d 1171, 1183 (1994) (same).
40. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs,
191 F.3d 845, 852 (7th Cir. 1999). In the Seventh Circuit, the SWANCC plaintiffs argued
that the "migratory bird rule [was] unreasonable because it is designed to preserve wildlife
rather than water quality," an argument the court rejected. Id.
41. Id.
42. United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 257 (4th Cir. 1997). In Wilson, the court
thought that the Corps' inclusion of purely intrastate waters, the use of which could affect
interstate commerce, in the definition of "waters of the United States" presented "serious
constitutional difficulties" because "it would appear to exceed congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause." Id. The Seventh Circuit's first decision in Hoffnan
Homes, Inc. v. Adm'r, United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 961 F.2d 1310, 1316 (7th Cir.
1992) stressed the water quality objectives of the CWA and found that section 404
jurisdiction did not extend to isolated wetlands. A petition for rehearing was filed and
granted, and the court referred the matter to a senior staff attorney for settlement
negotiations. See Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Adm'r, United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 999
F.2d 256,259 (7th Cir. 1993). The parties were unable to reach a settlement, and the case
was reargued before the same panel of judges. Id. at 259-60. This time the court upheld
the Migratory Bird Rule but found there was no evidence that migratory birds actually
used the site in question. Id. at 261-62.
43. The history of the CWA section 404 program from 1975 until 1997 was one of
expanding the scope of its coverage. See, e.g., Kalen, supra note 39, at 892-913 (describing
the legislative, administrative, and litigational history of the CWA from 1975-1993). In
the late 1990s a more conservative bench began striking down expansive section 404
regulations. See, e.g., Wilson, 133 F.3d at 257 (holding 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) invalid as
beyond the authority granted to the Corps under the CWA); Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. United
States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1410 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (ruling that the attempt
to regulate incidental discharges exceeded the Corps' authority under the CWA).
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the section 404 landscape and rendered meaningless the twenty-five
year battle to make section 404 a comprehensive wetlands protection
program.
A. What Are the "Waters of the United States"?
1. Pre-SWANCC Developments
The CWA leaves considerable room for disagreement over its
coverage. The basic prohibition of the Act is that, without a federal
permit, "the discharge of any pollutant is ilegal." "Pollutants" are
defined, in part, as "dredged spoil, solid waste ... biological materials
... rock, [and] sand."'4 A discharge of a pollutant is said to take place
whenever there is "any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters
from any point source. 46 If Congress had stopped at that point, there
probably would be less debate over the coverage of the Act.
Congress went on to say, however, that "navigable waters" means
"the waters of the United States," but provided no further statutory
guidance as to what water bodies and waterways were "waters of the
United States." That task was left to the EPA and the Corps.
The regulations initially promulgated by the Corps exhibited a
very conservative approach. The 1974 regulations limited the section
404 permit program to the same waters then regulated under the
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,47 that is, "waters that are subject to
the ebb and flow of the tide shoreward to their mean high water mark
... and/or waters that are presently used, were used in the past, or
may be susceptible to use to transport interstate or foreign
commerce."48  In National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
44. 33 U.S.C. § 1301(a) (1994).
45. Id. § 1362(6).
46. Id. § 1362(12). A point source is defined in 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1994) as "any
discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including, but not limited to, any pipe,
ditch, channel ... from which pollutants are or may be discharged." Courts have
interpreted this definition very broadly. See, e.g., United States v. Lambert, 915 F. Supp.
797 (S.D.W.Va. 1996) (including bulldozers, backhoes, draglines, and other earthmoving
equipment as CWA point sources).
47. 33 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403-04, 406-09, 411-16, 418 (1994); see also infra notes 93-116
and accompanying text (explaining the judicial interpretation of "navigable waters of the
United States" as used in the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899).
48. Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122, 37,123 (July
19, 1977). This is still the definition of "navigable waters of the United States" for
purposes of determining whether jurisdiction exists under the Rivers and Harbors Act of
1899. See 33 C.F.R. § 329.4 (2000). This regulation in fact overstates the Corps'
jurisdiction under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899. In Minnehaha Creek Watershed
Dist. v. Hoffman, 597 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1979), the court rejected the Corps' attempt to
assert jurisdiction over a waterbody that formed a segment of a commercial highway
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Callaway,49 however, the National Wildlife Federation and other
environmental groups successfully challenged these regulations.
According to the court, by using the phrase "waters of the United
States," Congress intended to assert "federal jurisdiction over the
nation's waters to the maximum extent permissible under the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution." 50  The court ordered the
promulgation of regulations fully embodying the mandate of section
404 of the CWA.5 But the court left to the Corps the responsibility
of determining what was the "maximum extent permissible under the
Commerce Clause."
The amended regulations, published in 1977,2 included 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3(a)(3), the intrastate waters regulation. This regulation stated
that "waters of the United States" included "intrastate lakes, rivers,
streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats,
wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or
natural ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect
interstate or foreign commerce. 53  Thus, as a general matter, the
regulation requires a connection between a particular, wholly
intrastate body of water and interstate or foreign commerce.
However, under the "cumulative effects" doctrine,54 the EPA and
Corps also claimed section 404 jurisdiction existed even where such
an individual connection was absent.55 According to the agencies, if
consisting of water, rail, and road connections, because the waterbody itself did not form
part of a continuous highway for the movement of goods or people solely by water in
interstate or foreign commerce. Id. at 622; see also Hardy Salt Co. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co.,
501 F.2d 1156, 1169 (10th Cir. 1974) (rejecting a claim of Corps jurisdiction over the Great
Salt Lake because it did not form part of a "continued highway over which commerce is or
may be carried on with other states or foreign countries, by water"). The Corps never
amended its 1974 regulations, one assumes, because the 1977 section 404 regulations
allowed the Corps to assert a broader jurisdiction and regulate, in most cases, the same
activities as those regulated under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.
49. 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975).
50. Id. at 686.
51. Id.
52. Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122 (July 19,
1977) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328).
53. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (2000) (emphasis added).
54. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 133 (1942) (holding that the commerce
power extends to activities that, considered in the aggregate, assert a substantial effect on
interstate commerce); United States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719, 733-34 (3d Cir. 1993)
(upholding Corps jurisdiction over dumping in wetlands using the cumulative effects
doctrine).
55. See, e.g., Memorandum from United States Environmental Protection Agency and
the United States Army Corps of Engineers, (May 29, 1998), at http://www.epa.gov/owowl
wetlands/wilson.htm (interpreting the Wilson decision narrowly) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter 1998 Guidance]. This guidance was withdrawn for
16792001]
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the use, degradation, or destruction of a class of waterbodies would in
the aggregate have a substantial effect on interstate or foreign
commerce, section 404 also applied. 6
2. The Migratory Bird Rule
The Corps' use of the so-called "Migratory Bird Rule" to
establish the nexus between a particular isolated water or wetland
and interstate commerce troubled opponents of section 404. The
Corps' and the EPA's position was that, if wetlands or other
waterbodies "are or would be used as habitat by ... migratory birds
which cross state lines,"57 the necessary interstate commerce
connection exists to make such areas jurisdictional "waters of the
United States. 58  Because migratory birds utilize many isolated
wetlands and other waters for habitat and a billion-dollar bird-
hunting and bird-watching industry exists, the agencies argued that
the presence of migratory birds or the existence of suitable migratory
bird habitat was sufficient, in and of itself, to establish that the
waterbody is or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for
recreation or other purposes.59 Therefore, small, isolated, non-
navigable, wholly intrastate bodies of water or wetlands areas were
"waters of the United States" and within the geographic scope of
section 404.60
Not surprisingly, this broad assertion of regulatory authority by
the EPA and the Corps did not sit well with many private property
owners whose lands fell within such a broad definition of "waters of
reconsideration following the United States Supreme Court decision in SWANCC.
Memorandum from United States Environmental Protection Agency and the United
States Army Corps of Engineers, (Jan. 19, 2001), at http:llwww.epa.govlowowl
wetlands/swancc-ogc.html (providing guidance for Corps and EPA field offices regarding
section 404 jurisdiction over isolated waters) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review) [hereinafter 2001 Guidance].
56. 1998 Guidance, supra note 55. But see Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, Waterfowl,
and the Menace of Mr. Wilson: Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and the Limits of Federal
Wetlands Regulation, 29 ENVTL. L. 1, 35 (1999) (arguing that "the 'class of activities' itself
must be subject to federal jurisdiction to come under federal control .... The filling of
intrastate, isolated wetlands does not meet this test, as this 'class of activities' is not
inherently economic or commercial in nature").
57. Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg.
41,206, 41,217 (Nov. 13,1986).
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Adm'r, United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 999
F.2d 256,260-61 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding the Migratory Bird Rule valid).
60. Hoffman Homes, 999 F.2d at 260-61; see also Stephen M. Johnson, Federal
Regulation Of Isolated Wetlands, 23 ENVTL. L. 1, 13-27 (1993) (discussing the Migratory
Bird Rule and pre-1993 case law).
1680 [Vol. 79
2001] NOW OPEN FOR DEVELOPMENT 1681
the United States." Lawsuits challenging the use of the Migratory
Bird Rule were filed. Initially the results were mixed, with the
Seventh61 and Ninth Circuits62 upholding the rule, but the Fourth
Circuit finding it invalid on procedural grounds.63
3. The SWANCC Litigation and Decision
In 1998, the Migratory Bird Rule was challenged again in the
Seventh Circuit in the SWANCC litigation.' The plaintiff, a
municipal corporation created by an intragovernmental agreement,
sought to open a balefill operation to dispose of nonhazardous
61. In Hoffman Homes, the Seventh Circuit found it reasonable to conclude that the
presence of migratory birds in small, man-made ponds established a sufficient connection
to interstate commerce because "millions of people annually spend more than a billion
dollars on hunting, trapping, and observing migratory birds." Hoffman Homes, 999 F.2d
at 261. The Hoffman Homes litigation involved the application of 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(3)
(2000), which is identical to the Corps regulation, 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (2000). Initially
the Seventh Circuit held that 230.3(s)(3), "as it applies to isolated wetlands, is contrary to
the [Clean Water] Act and therefore invalid." Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Adm'r, United
States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 961 F.2d 1310, 1316 (7th Cir. 1992). The EPA then filed a
petition for a rehearing, which was granted and the earlier opinion and order vacated.
Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Adm'r, United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 975 F.2d 1554, 1554
(7th Cir. 1992). This time the Seventh Circuit upheld 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(3) and held that
it was "reasonable to interpret the regulation as allowing migratory birds to be that
connection between a wetland and interstate commerce." Hoffman Homes, 999 F.2d at
261. But the court found there was insufficient evidence to establish that the area in
question was suitable for migratory bird habitat and again vacated the administrative
penalty. Id. at 262. Thus, the Migratory Bird Rule was upheld, but its application to a
particular waterbody required substantial evidence that the area was in fact suitable
habitat for migratory birds. Id.
62. In Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir. 1990), the Ninth
Circuit held that the presence of migratory birds in temporary ponds containing wetland
vegetation was a sufficient connection to interstate commerce to sustain Corps jurisdiction
under section 404. In a subsequent appeal in the same litigation, Leslie Salt Co. v. United
States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir. 1995), the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its earlier holding,
but noted that "[tihe migratory bird rule certainly tests the limits of Congress's commerce
powers and, some would argue, the bounds of reason."
63. In Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 885 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1989) (1989 U.S. App.
LEXIS 14057) (unpublished opinion), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a
lower court decision, Tabb Lakes, Ltd v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 726, 729 (E.D. Va.
1988), holding the Migratory Bird Rule invalid on the ground that it was promulgated in
violation of the federal Administrative Procedure Act. The basis for the decision was that
the rule was promulgated without the required notice and comment required by the Act.
Id. at 729. In Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388 (9th Cir. 1995), however, the
court stated it is "plausible to find that the preamble is merely an interpretative rule, and
thus not subject to the notice-and-comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure
Act." Id. at 1394; see also Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army
Corps of Eng'rs, 998 F. Supp. 946, 956-57 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (concluding that "the preamble
was not substantive rulemaking").
64. Solid Waste Agency, 998 F. Supp. at 946.
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waste. 5 The chosen site was an abandoned gravel pit, portions of
which had evolved into a number of permanent and seasonal ponds.'
The project required the filling of the ponds. The Corps originally
decided that the ponds were not "waters of the United States," 67 but
later changed its opinion68 after being informed that more than one
hundred different species of birds, including migratory waterfowl,
were observed at the site.69 The Corps then denied the permit
application for the operation, and the municipalities sued.70  The
district court granted summary judgment to the Corps and held that it
did have jurisdiction.71
On appeal, the municipalities argued that: (1) Congress lacked
the constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause to require
permits for activities in isolated, non-navigable, wholly intrastate
wetlands; (2) the Corps had exceeded its statutory authority under
the CWA by using the Migratory Bird Rule; and (3) the rule was
invalid because it was promulgated in violation of the Administrative
Procedure Act.' The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals once again
upheld the Migratory Bird Rule and affirmed the district court.73 A
petition for certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme
Court.74 The case was argued in November 2000 and on January 9,
2001, the United States Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision,
struck down the Migratory Bird Rule.75
Although the majority believed that the assertion of federal
jurisdiction over isolated, non-navigable, wholly intrastate bodies of
water raised significant constitutional questions,76 the Court declined
to decide those issues.77  The specific holding was narrow: The
65. Id. at 948.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 949.
69. Id. at 948-49.
70. Id. at 949.
71. Id. at 957.
72. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs,
191 F.3d 845, 849 (7th Cir. 1999).
73. Id. at 853.
74. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs,
529 U.S. 1129 (2000).
75. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs,
531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001).
76. Id. at 173-74.
77. Id. at 174. This surely is a disappointment to those who have argued that the
Migratory Bird Rule is an unconstitutional violation of the Commerce Clause. See, e.g.,
Adler, supra note 56, at 33-40, 66 (asserting that the United States Supreme Court
decision in Lopez does not support the claim that the power to protect migratory birds
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Migratory Bird Rule exceeded the authority granted by Congress in
the CWA.78 Consequently, the Corps lacked section 404 jurisdiction
over the ponds. The majority opinion did not say that the intrastate
waters regulation, 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3), was invalid. Nor did it say
that the Corps would not have jurisdiction if the interstate commerce
connection were predicated on some basis other than the presence of
migratory birds. Thus, the narrowest reading of the decision might be
that the presence of migratory birds alone does not make isolated
waters and wetlands "waters of the United States. 79
4. The Meaning and Aftermath of the SWANCC Decision
a. The Corps' and EPA's Reaction to SWANCC
The Corps and EPA may give SWANCC such a narrow reading.
When the Fourth Circuit invalided the Migratory Bird Rule, the
agencies' response was to issue a joint memorandum stating that,
without relying upon the Migratory Bird Rule, the EPA and the
Corps would continue to assert jurisdiction over isolated waters and
wetlands in the Fourth Circuit if the interstate commerce nexus
otherwise existed.80 Whether the agencies will do the same with
does not extend to the habitats in which they live); Richard Lazarus, Corps Slips On
Lopez, FWS Wins, ENVTL. F., Mar-Apr. 1998, at 8 (observing that the Corps' wetlands
regulations were constitutional prior to Lopez, but unconstitutional afterwards).
78. The exact language of the Court was: "33 C.F.R. see. 328.3(a)(3) (1999), as ...
applied to petitioner's balefill site pursuant to the 'Migratory Bird Rule' ... exceeds the
authority granted to ... [the EPA and the Corps] under sec. 404(a) of the CWA."
SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001).
79. See 2001 Guidance, supra note 55 (indicating that the agencies intend to give
SWANCC a narrow reading); see also infra text accompanying note 81 (explaining this
construction).
80. WILLIAM L. WANT, LAW OF WETLANDS REGULATION § 4.27 (2000). The
decision in Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 885 F.2d 866, (4th Cir. 1989) (1989 U.S. App.
LEXIS 14057) (unpublished opinion) had little effect on the assertion of jurisdiction by
the Corps over isolated wetlands and waterbodies in the Fourth Circuit. The continued
assertion of such jurisdiction led to the litigation in United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251
(4th Cir. 1997), in which the court held that 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3), the provision defining
CWA jurisdiction over isolated waters, was not authorized by the CWA and was invalid.
Id. at 253-54. Once again the Corps and EPA disagreed with the Fourth Circuit and
issued a joint memorandum stating that the application of the Wilson decision would be
limited to the Fourth Circuit. 1998 Guidance, supra note 55. Even within the Fourth
Circuit, 404 jurisdiction would still be asserted over isolated waters where either (1) an
actual link to interstate commerce could be shown, or (2) under the cumulative effects
doctrine, the use, degradation, or destruction of the waters in question would have a
substantial effect on interstate or foreign commerce. Id. The Wilson case might be viewed
as the precursor to SWANCC. In Wilson, the court stated:
When viewed in light of its statutory authority, 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (1993),
which defines "waters of the United States" to include intrastate waters that need
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SWANCC is unclear. In the closing days of the Clinton
Administration, the agencies did issue a joint memorandum
suggesting they might take such a position. The memorandum stated:
a. Waters covered solely by [328.3](a)(3) that could affect
interstate commerce by virtue of their use as habitat by
migratory birds are no longer considered to be "waters of
the United States." The Court's opinion did not specifically
address what other connections with interstate commerce
might support CWA jurisdiction over "nonnavigable,
isolated, intrastate waters" under subsection (a)(3).
Therefore, as specific cases arise, please consult agency legal
counsel8
1
After the case was remanded to the Seventh Circuit, the Court of
Appeals likewise took a very narrow view of the SWANCC holding.
The court sent the case back to the district court directing it to
determine whether the only properly presented basis for the
Corps' requirement of a permit was the Migratory Bird Rule
or if alternate grounds of jurisdiction not inconsistent with
the Supreme Court's opinion remain available ... if [the
District Court] ... finds another proper basis for
jurisdiction, then it shall conduct further proceedings.8
If SWANCC is given a narrow reading by the Corps, the EPA,
and lower courts, then it will have little impact on federal regulation
of activities affecting isolated waters and wetlands. However, there is
much language in the majority opinion to strongly suggest the sending
have nothing to do with navigable or interstate waters, expands the statutory
phrase "waters of the United States" beyond its definitional limit. Accordingly,
we believe that in promulgating [the regulation] ... the Army Corps of
Engineers exceeded its congressional authorization under the Clean Water Act,
and that, for this reason, 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (1993) is invalid.
133 F.3d at 257.
81. 2001 Guidance, supra note 55 (emphasis added). The memorandum goes on to
reaffirm the existence of CWA section 404 jurisdiction over the waters described in 33
C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1), (2), (4), (6), and (7). Id. At the same time, the Agencies withdrew
for reconsideration the joint guidance issued after the Fourth Circuit's ruling in United
States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997). 2001 Guidance, supra note 55. In March
2001, it was reported that the Corps was revisiting the wetlands definition and would
remove the category of isolated, wholly intrastate water bodies. John H. Stain, Wetlands:
Court Decision on Isolated Waters Prompts Army Corps to Revise Definition, BNA DAILY
ENVrL. REPORT 1, Mar. 5, 2001. As of July 2001, however, neither the Corps nor the
EPA nor any other agency has made or issued any additional statements to this effect.
Therefore, the only official guidance document on this topic is the January 19, 2001
document cited supra, which contains a narrow interpretation of the SWANCC decision.
82. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs,
No. 98-2277,2001 WL 312372 (7th Cir. 2001) (unpublished opinion).
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of a broader message. 83  And it is this broader message that
jeopardizes the continued protection of isolated waters and wetlands
from harmful activities.
b. The Broader Message of SWANCC
Relying on a 1972 congressional conference report, the
proponents of a broad interpretation of the words "waters of the
United States" have argued that the defining of "navigable" as
"waters of the United States" establishes a congressional intent not to
limit the jurisdictional scope of the CWA to navigable waters as
traditionally understood.8" Instead, Congress intended that the term
"navigable waters," as used in the CWA, be given the broadest
possible constitutional interpretation, unencumbered by agency
determinations that have been made or may be made for
administrative purposes. Thus, under this view, the jurisdictional
scope of the CWA was co-extensive with the powers of Congress
under the Commerce Clause.86 This, however, is not the view of the
SWANCC majority.
According to the majority, such a broad interpretation would be
an unwarranted reading of the word "navigable" out of the statute.
In their view, "[t]he term 'navigable' has at least the import of
showing ... what Congress had in mind as its authority for enacting
the CWA: its traditional jurisdiction over waters that were or had
been navigable-in-fact or which could reasonably be so made."'  In
its 1985 decision in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,88 the
Court stated that the term "navigable," as used in the CWA, was of
83. For example, at one point the majority opinion states: "In order to rule for
[the Corps], we would have to hold that the jurisdiction of the Corps extends to ponds that
are not adjacent to open water. But we conclude that the text of the statute will not allow
this." Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531
U.S. 159, 168 (2001); see also Dreher, supra note 16, at 8 ("Although the Court's opinion
does not preclude the possibility that a nexus sufficient to justify federal regulation could
be demonstrated between an isolated water and traditionally navigable waters on grounds
other than migratory bird use, it will be difficult for federal regulators to show such
connections.").
84. The traditional understanding of navigable waters is what the SWANCC majority
refers to as the "classical understanding." SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 171 (2001).
85. S. CONF. REP. No. 92-1236, at 144 (1972).
86. See, e.g., United States v. Lambert, 695 F.2d 536,538 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that
the CVA reaches to the full extent of the Commerce Clause); United States v. Tull, 769
F.2d 182, 184 (4th Cir. 1985) (citing with approval legislative history of congressional
intent to regulate to the limits of the Commerce Clause).
87. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172.
88. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
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limited effect,89 but the SWANCC majority makes it clear the term
should not be read out of the statute. According to Chief Justice
Rehnquist, "[I]t is one thing to give a word limited effect and quite
another to give it no effect." 9 Thus, embedded within the phrase
"waters of the United States" is the concept of "navigability." In
virtually the same breath, the majority also said that "[in] Riverside
Bayview Homes we recognized that Congress intended the phrase
'navigable waters' to include at least some waters that would not have
been deemed navigable under the classical understanding of that
term."91  The issue, then, is what is the meaning of the word
"navigable" for purposes of federal CWA jurisdiction? As to this
question, the SWANCC Court does not provide clear guidancef 2
89. Id. at 133; see also SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172 (citing Riverside Bayview Homes,
474 U.S. 121 (1985)).
90. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172.
91. Id. at 171. In its unanimous 1985 opinion in Riverside Bayview Homes, the Court,
citing the same conference report, states: "Congress evidently intended to repudiate limits
that had been placed upon federal regulation by earlier water pollution control statutes
and to exercise its power under the Commerce Clause to regulate at least some waters that
would not be deemed 'navigable' under the classical understanding of that term."
Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 133 (citing S. CoNF. REP. No. 92-1236, at 144
(1974)).
92. In his dissent, however, Justice Stevens reads the majority opinion as limiting
"waters of the United States" to navigable-in-fact waters, their tributaries, and wetlands
adjacent to each. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 176-77 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This reading is
consistent with language in the majority opinion.
In the majority opinion, the SWANCC Court states that Riverside Bayview Homes
held that the Corps had section 404 jurisdiction over wetlands that actually abutted a
navigable waterway, but expressed no opinion as to whether the Corps had such
jurisdiction over wetlands that are not adjacent to bodies of open water. SWANCC, 531
U.S. at 167. The SWANCC Court also emphasized that the 1974 regulations, those the
Corps was forced to rewrite as result of the district court decision in Calloway, did not
attempt to assert jurisdiction over non-navigable waters. Id. at 168. The Court further
remarks that it does not agree with the argument "that Congress's separate definitional
use of the phrase 'waters of the United States' constitutes a basis for reading the term
'navigable' out of the statute." Id. at 172.
Justice Stevens's reading of the Court's opinion is anticipated by the earlier
Fourth Circuit decision in United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997). In Wilson,
defendants were convicted in federal district court of four felony violations of the CWA
for knowingly discharging fill and excavated material into wetlands of the United States
without a permit. Wilson, 133 F.3d at 251. The Court of Appeals, however, held that 33
C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (1993), the regulation the government relied upon as the basis for
assertion of section 404 jurisdiction over the area in question, was invalid. Id. The precise
holding of the court is debatable due to both the lack of clarity of the principal opinion
and the fact that each of the three judges filed separate opinions.
One reading of the majority opinion on the issue of the validity of 33
C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) is that the court only decided that the use of the words "could affect"
in 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) was not authorized by the CWA as limited by the Commerce
Clause. Under that reading, the section 404 jurisdiction exists for waters that have a
"substantial effect" on interstate commerce or a nexus with navigable or interstate waters.
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The "classical understanding" to which the majority may be
referring is the interpretation of "navigable" in the Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1899.93 Section ten of that act makes it unlawful to
engage in a number of activities that adversely affect "navigable
waters of the United States." 94 In interpreting and applying section
ten to fresh waters,95 the courts have consistently defined "navigable
waters of the United States" as navigable-in-fact waters that, in their
ordinary condition by themselves, or by uniting with other waters,
form a continuous highway over which commerce is or may be carried
on with other states or foreign countries in the customary modes in
which commerce is conducted by water.96
Another reading of Wilson, consistent with Justice Stevens' interpretation of the majority
opinion in SWANCC, is that the Fourth Circuit held that the phrase "waters of the United
States" refers to waters which, if not navigable-in-fact, are at least interstate or closely
related to navigable or interstate waters. Under such a reading, wholly intrastate, isolated
water bodies and wetlands would not qualify as "waters of the United States." EPA and
the Corps gave the Wilson opinion the less restrictive reading and continued to assert
jurisdiction:
over any and all isolated water bodies, including isolated wetlands within the
Fourth Circuit, based on the CWA statute itself, where (1) either agency can
establish an actual link between that water body and interstate or foreign
commerce, and (2) individually and/or in the aggregate, the use, degradation, or
destruction of isolated waters with such a link would have a substantial effect on
interstate or foreign commerce. Those actual connections with, and effects on
interstate or foreign commerce may include all the types of actual effects on
interstate or foreign commerce that the Corps and EPA have traditionally relied
on; for example, use for recreation by interstate and foreign travelers; use by
industries operating in interstate or foreign commerce; use by migratory
waterfowl, other game birds, or other migratory birds that are sought by hunters,
birdwatchers, or photographers, or are protected by international treaty, thereby
affecting interstate commerce.
1998 Guidance, supra note 55 (emphasis added). Of course, the Supreme Court's decision
in SWANCC may negate this attempted end run around the Wilson decision.
93. 33 U.S.C. §§ 401,403-04,406-09, 411-16,418 (1994).
94. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1994). Poorly drafted, the section uses both the phrases "waters
of the United States" and "navigable waters of the United States."
95. In The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443,458 (1851), the
Court held that navigable waters of the United States include waters subject to the ebb
and flow of the tide.
96. The meaning of the phrase "navigable waters of the United States" is
determined in accordance with the basic test set forth in The Daniel Ball ....
Legislative history of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 indicates that it was
understood by its drafters to be merely a restatement of existing law .... The
extent of federal regulatory power under section 10 of the Act ... is limited to
"navigable ... waters of the United States." [sic] Since this is the precise phrase
which was defined by the Supreme Court in The Daniel Ball, and which was used
in that case and others to describe the reach of the federal commerce power over
navigable waters ... we must assume that Congress intended the phrase to have
the meaning which it had acquired in contemporary judicial interpretation.
Minnehaha Creek Watershed Dist. v. Hoffman, 597 F.2d 617, 622 (8th Cir. 1979). In The
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There are three critical aspects of this definition of "navigable
waters." First, waters are "navigable" only if navigable-in-fact.
Second, to be "navigable waters of the United States," the waters
must be of a continuous water highway over which goods can be
moved, solely by water, in interstate or foreign commerce. Third, this
definition of navigable waters is not co-extensive with Congress's
power to regulate activities occurring on or in water bodies located
within the geographic boundaries of the United States.9 For
example, if a river or other water body is only a water link in a chain
of activities moving goods by water and land in interstate or foreign
commerce, then the water body is not part of the "navigable waters of
the United States." Nonetheless, exercising its powers under the
Commerce Clause, Congress has regulated those aspects of the
movement of goods in interstate or foreign commerce taking place on
such a water body.98 "Navigable waters of the United States" is
therefore a term of art, which does not include all waters within the
Daniel Ball, the United States Supreme Court stated:
[Waters are navigable] in law which are navigable in fact. And they are
navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their
ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or
may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water. And
they constitute navigable waters of the United States within the meaning of acts of
Congress ... when they form in their ordinary condition by themselves, or by
uniting with other waters, a continued highway over which commerce is or may be
carried on with other States or foreign countries in the customary modes in which
such commerce is conducted by water.
The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870) (emphasis added). Later this definition
was expanded to include nontidal waters that were navigable in the past or could be made
navigable through reasonable improvements. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power
Co., 311 U.S. 377,409 (1940).
97. See, e.g., Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 578 F.2d 742,753 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that
the Rivers and Harbors Act did not extend to the mean high water mark, but the Act did
not represent a full exertion of Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause).
98. See, e.g., Minnehaha Creek Watershed Dist., 597 F.2d at 623-25, 627-28 (denying
jurisdiction to the federal government over a lake solely within the boundaries of the State
of Minnesota under the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act, but granting jurisdiction
to the federal government to such lake under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act).
The court held that waters that do not form themselves, or in conjunction with other
waters, a continued highway over which interstate commerce can be conducted are not
"navigable waters of the United States." Id. It rejected the Corps contention that a
waterbody that formed a segment of a commercial highway, which may consist of water,
rail, or road connections, is a "navigable water of the United States," but stated that it was
not implying that Congress could not extend federal jurisdiction over such bodies of water
in the exercise of its Commerce Clause powers. Id. at 624. In fact, the court went on to
hold that, although the Corps did not have jurisdiction under the Rivers and Harbors Act
over activities in such bodies of water, it did have jurisdiction under section 404 of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, the predecessor of the CWA. Id.
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United States, nor all those affecting interstate commerce and thus
subject to Congress's power under the Commerce Clause.
When the Court in Riverside Bayview Homes stated that
Congress, by using the phrase "waters of the United States" in the
CWA, intended to "repudiate limits that had been placed on federal
regulation by earlier water pollution control statutes and to exercise
its powers under the Commerce Clause to regulate some waters that
would not be deemed 'navigable' under the classical understanding of
that term," 99 the limits being repudiated were those imposed by the
judicial interpretation of "navigable waters of the United States" as
used in the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.0
If that is so, and if "waters of the United States" was intended to
include more than the traditional "navigable waters of the United
States," the venerable 1870 case of The Daniel Balli0 may provide
some additional guidance. In The Daniel Ball, the Court draws a
distinction between "navigable waters of the United States" and
"navigable waters of the States." "Navigable waters of the States,"
99. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985).
100. Section thirteen of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1994),
known as the Refuse Act, perhaps is one example of the limits placed upon federal
regulation by earlier water pollution control statutes. Section 13 makes it unlawful:
to ... discharge ... any refuse matter.., into any navigable water of the United
States, or into any tributary of any navigable water of the United States from
which the same shall float or be washed into such navigable water; and it shall
not be lawful to deposit.., material of any kind in any place on the bank of any
navigable water, or the bank of any tributary of any navigable water, or on the
bank of any tributary of any navigable water, where the same shall be liable to be
washed into such navigable water.
Id. As with the other sections of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, federal jurisdiction
is limited to navigable waters of the United States and extends to tributaries of such
navigable waters only when material placed in the tributaries or on the banks of the
tributaries would pose a threat to the navigable waters of the United States. In a critique
of the Seventh Circuit's SWANCC decision, one article observed:
Traditionally, "navigable waters" meant "waters navigable in fact." Over time,
however, courts extended the concept to include waters capable of navigation
through reasonable improvement. The legislative history of the CWA indicates
[that Congress intended] to avoid the most "limited" or "technical" definition...
in favor of a definition "in line with more recent judicial opinions" that
"expanded that limited view of navigability... to include waterways which would
be "susceptible of being used ... with reasonable improvement, ' "as well as
those waterways which include sections obstructed by fall, rapids, sand bars,
currents, floating debris, et cetera.'"
Mayer, Brown & Platt, United States: One For The Birds: The Corps Of Engineers'
"Migratory Bird Rule," MONDAQ Bus. BRIEFING, Nov. 24, 2000, available at 2000 WL
9240067. In addition to this broader view of navigability, it appears that Congress did not
intend the concept in the CWA to be limited to the The Daniel Ball definition of
"navigable waters of the United States." 118 CONG. REC. 33,756 (1972).
101. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
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the Court ruled, are those that are navigable-in-fact, but need not
form a continuous highway for the movement of goods in interstate
or foreign commerce. 102 Therefore, one reading of "waters of the
United States," as used in the CWA, is that waters of the United
States include all "navigable-in-fact" waters in the United States, a
definition broader than the classical understanding, but one which
still gives significance to the word "navigable."
This definition of "waters of the United States" can be reconciled
with the earlier United States Supreme Court decision in Riverside
Bayview Homes."0 In that case, the Court, in a unanimous opinion,
held that wetlands adjacent"° to navigable waters were "waters of the
United States."'"5 The wetlands at issue in Riverside Bayview Homes
were not themselves navigable-in-fact. They consisted of saturated
soil and wetlands vegetation extending some distance to a nearby
navigable river.106 The question was whether it was reasonable for the
Corps to include within "waters of the United States" adjacent
wetlands hydrologically connected with navigable-in-fact waters but
not flooded or permeated by navigable-in-fact waters. Because the
goal of the CWA was protection and enhancement of the nation's
waters, inclusion of such adjacent wetlands was deemed
appropriateY°7 This is not dissimilar to the treatment of issues of
navigability in other contexts. For example, in obstruction of
navigation and public trust title cases, a navigable waterway is not just
the navigable-in-fact channel or portions. Under the "full breadth
rule," a waterbody is deemed navigable-in-law from the mean high
water mark on one shore to the mean high water mark on the
102. Id. at 563.
103. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
104. The Corps regulation states that: "The term 'adjacent' means bordering,
contiguous, or neighboring. Wetlands separated from other waters of the United States by
man-made dikes or barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes and the like are 'adjacent
wetlands.'" 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c) (2000).
105. According to the Court, a "definition of 'waters of the United States'
encompassing all wetlands adjacent to other bodies of water over which the Corps has
jurisdiction is a permissible interpretation of the [CWA]." Riverside Bayview Homes, 474
U.S. at 135. Part of the reasoning of the Corps in its inclusion of adjacent wetlands in its
definition of "waters of the United States" was that even "wetlands that are not flooded
by adjacent waters may still tend to drain into those waters. In such circumstances, the
Corps has concluded that wetlands may serve to filter and purify water draining into
adjacent bodies of water.., and to slow the flow of surface runoff." Id. at 134. Wetlands,
whether adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters or to their tributaries, perform these
functions and thus play an important role in achieving the goal of the CWA to protect the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters.
106. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 130-31.
107. Id. at 133-35.
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opposite shore. 08 What is part and parcel of the navigable waterbody
depends on the reason for asking the question. If the issue is water
quality, then it is not unreasonable to consider hydrologically
connected adjacent wetlands part of the navigable waters.
Such an interpretation would also be consistent with older
United States Supreme Court opinions addressing the reach of the
more limited Rivers and Harbors Act of 1890,109 the predecessor of
the 1899 Act. The purpose of that Act, and the later 1899 Act, was to
protect the navigable capacity of the "navigable waters of the United
States." Consistent with this congressional objective, the Court, in
United States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Company,"0 held that
the United States could enjoin the construction of a dam on a non-
navigable portion of the upper Rio Grande River in New Mexico."'
Although the defendants argued that the federal legislation
prohibiting obstruction of navigable waters of the United States only
applied to the navigable waters themselves, the Court held that the
Act prohibited any obstruction to the navigable capacity of the
navigable waters of the United States "wherever done or however
done.""' Similarly, the CWA should be read as reaching activities in
adjacent hydrologically connected areas that reasonably could pollute
navigable-in-fact waters. Under such an approach, activities in non-
navigable tributaries and their adjacent wetlands would also be
subject to section 404. In fact, the SWANCC majority intimates that
"waters of the United States" includes non-navigable tributaries and
streams.
13
Isolated, navigable-in-fact, wholly intrastate waters, their non-
navigable tributaries, and wetlands adjacent to either, would still be
section 404 jurisdictional waters or wetlands under this reading of
108. See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. §§ 329.11(a), 329.12 (2000) (extending federal regulatory
jurisdiction to the entire water surface and bed of a navigable waterbody, which includes
all the land and water below the ordinary high water mark).
109. Pub. L. No. 51-907,26 Stat. 453 (1890).
110. 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
111. Id. at 690,696,698.
112. Id. at 708-09.
113. This is done as part of the majority's discussion of 404(g) which allows, upon
meeting certain requirements, a state to administer the 404 permit program for "navigable
waters (other than those waters which are presently used, or are susceptible to use in their
natural condition or by reasonable improvement as a means to transport interstate or
foreign commerce ... including wetlands adjacent thereto)." 33 U.S.C. § 1344(g)(1)
(1994). Section 1344(g) shows that Congress did intend for the term "navigable waters,"
as used in the CWA, to encompass more than waters that are navigable-in-fact and their
adjacent wetlands. How much more is not clear. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook
County v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159,171 (2001).
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SWANCC.114 What is left out of "waters of the United States" are
only isolated, non-navigable-in-fact, wholly intrastate waters and
wetlands.115 The justification for excluding such waters and wetlands
would be that activities in such areas will not affect the chemical,
physical, or biological integrity of navigable-in-fact waters, the
protection of which, in the Court's view, was the objective of the
CWA.116 Unfortunately, this means that many ecologically important
North Carolina wetlands will not be protected by section 404.117
114. For example, the Great Salt Lake is an isolated, wholly intrastate, navigable-in-
fact waterbody and a navigable water of the state of Utah. See United States v. Utah, 403
U.S. 9, 9-11 (1971) (title to Great Salt Lake is in the State of Utah because the lake was
navigable at the time of statehood). But the Great Salt Lake is not a "navigable water of
the United States." See Hardy Salt Co. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 501 F.2d 1156, 1167-69
(10th Cir. 1974) (holding that navigable water of the United States requires a navigable
interstate linkage by water). If navigability is the key to section 404 jurisdiction, then such
jurisdiction extends to all navigable-in-fact streams, rivers, lakes, ponds, and other
navigable-in-fact bodies of water.
115. There is some indication that, at least in some Corps districts, SWANCC is being
given a narrow reading. Immediately after the SWANCC decision was issued, the
interpretation of the decision by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' Wilmington, North
Carolina district was that the presence of migratory birds was insufficient to establish the
requisite interstate commerce connection, but that other indicia such as the presence of
deer tracks, or the tracks of other animals that were the object of hunting activities would
suffice. Later the district was instructed that the mere presence of such tracks was not
enough, but the national offices of the EPA and the Corps provided little additional
guidance. As of the end of July, 2001, the Wilmington district continues to include
isolated, non-navigable, freshwater wetlands within section 404 jurisdictional waters and
wetlands if the district finds a sufficient interstate commerce connection. The connection
now must be more substantial than the mere presence of animal tracks. However, if the
district determines that hunting actually takes place in the area, then, in its opinion, a
sufficient interstate commerce nexus may exist since hunting activities involve both in-
state and out-of-state hunters. It is uncertain whether the presence of endangered species
satisfies the nexus requirement. Interview with Wayne Wright, Division Chief, Regulatory
Section, Wilmington District, United States Corps of Engineers, July 27, 2001 (on file with
the author). No formal written policy on the matter exists because, in May 2001, all Corps
districts were instructed not to develop new local practices but to await further guidance
from the national headquarters. At the same time, however, the districts were told to
continue to make wetlands determinations using past local practices. No further guidance
was provided. Memorandum from United States Army Corps of Engineers, (addressing
jurisdictional issues raised by the SWANCC decision) (May 11, 2001) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review). In addition, if requested, the Wilmington district continues
to make wetlands determinations for the benefit of the North Carolina Division of Water
Quality. Interview with Wayne Wright, supra.
116. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531
U.S. 159, 166-67 (2001).
117. The estimates of the impact of SWANCC cover a wide range because they depend
on what reading is given to the opinion. One estimate is that thirty to sixty percent of the
nation's wetlands could be removed from section 404 jurisdiction by SWANCC. See
Memorandum from Jon Kunsler to the Association of State Wetlands Managers (Feb. 8,
2001), at http://www.aswm.org (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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B. What Activities in Wetlands Are Subject to Section 404?
1. What is a Regulated Discharge?: The Tulloch Rule
The state of wetlands regulation in North Carolina depends not
only upon whether certain areas are section 404 jurisdictional
wetlands, but also upon whether the activities within such areas are
section 404 jurisdictional activities. Not all activities that might
adversely affect wetlands are subject to section 404. Only those
activities that involve a discharge of a pollutant are regulated by the
CWA.118 The CWA defines "discharge" to mean "any addition of any
pollutant to navigable waters from any point source."11 9 Pollutant is
defined as "dredged spoil ... biological materials, rock, [and]
sand.' 120  Only those activities that involve a discharge of those
pollutants constituting dredged spoil or fill materials are regulated
under section 404 of the CWA.12 As to those discharges, section 404
grants the Corps the authority to issue permits for the discharge of
such pollutants into waters of the United States." Under its
regulations, "dredged material" is defined as "material that is
excavated or dredged from the waters of the United States. ''l 23 "Fill
material" is broadly defined to include any material used "for the
primary purpose of replacing an aquatic area with dry land or of
changing the bottom elevation of a waterbody 1 24  As a practical
matter, the combined definitions include the addition of almost any
material to wetlands areas or other waterbodies.
A major area of controversy has been the application of these
regulations to mechanized landclearing activities taking place in
freshwater wetlands.1 5 To the extent that an area is a jurisdictional
wetland and thus a "water of the United States," its soil and
vegetation are part of the "waters of the United States." 126  Any
118. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1994).
119. Id. § 1362(12).
120. Id. § 1362(6).
121. Id. § 1311; id. § 1344.
122. Id. § 1311; id. § 1344.
123. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (2000).
124. Id. § 323.2(e).
125. The long history of litigation and rule making is described in Nat'l Mining Assoc.
v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1402 (D.C. Cir. 1998) and the
preamble to the January 17, 2001, revisions of the definition of "discharge of dredged
materials," 66 Fed. Reg. 4550,4550-51 (Jan. 17,2001).
126. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (2000) ("[D]redged material means material that is excavated
or dredged from waters of the United States."); see, e.g., Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v.
Alexander, 473 F. Supp. 525,532 (W.D. La. 1979) (holding that wetlands vegetation is part
of the "waters of the United States").
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excavation of such soil and removal of such plants is viewed as a
dredging activity.127 Consequently, movement and redeposit of
wetland soil and vegetation within the jurisdictional wetland is subject
to regulation under section 404 as a discharge of dredged or fill
material.
During mechanized excavation operations, material is rarely
completely removed from the site of the activity. Some of the
material may be redeposited at or near the site of the operations,
some material will fall off the equipment being used for removal,129
and other material may be purposely redeposited at varying distances
from the point of extraction.13 0 In 1983, in Avoyelles Sportsmen's
League v. Marsh131 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that such
redeposits could constitute discharges subject to regulation under the
CWA.132 Under pressure from various environmental groups, the
Corps adopted the position that most mechanized landclearing
operations in wetlands were subject to section 404 jurisdiction.133 The
theory was that these activities involved some discharge of dredged or
fill material. In its 1986 regulations, however, the Corps created an
exception for "de minimus, incidental discharges,""3 but this "de
127. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(1)(iii) (2000). Activities that involve only the cutting or
removal of vegetation above the ground when the activity involves neither substantially
disturbing the root system nor mechanized pushing, dragging, or similar activities are not
included in the definition of "discharge of dredged material." 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(3)(ii)
(2000).
128. Sidecasting is an example. Sidecasting involves placing removed soil by the side of
an excavated ditch.
129. This material is referred to as "incidental fallback." See Nat'l Mining, 145 F.3d at
1403-04 (describing such material as "incidental fallback" and holding that such material
is not a regulated section 404 discharge).
130. In Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, 473 F. Supp. at 527-29, the defendants were
clearing a 20,000-acre tract, much of which was forested wetlands. Trees and vegetation
were cut at or just above ground level, and the felled trees were pushed into wind rows.
131. 715 F.2d 897, 923-24 (5th Cir. 1983). In Avoyelles Sportsmen's League the court
said that the word" 'addition' ... may reasonably be understood to include 'redeposit.' "
Id. at 925. However, because the court found there was a discharge of fill material, the
court did not have to decide whether there was also a discharge of dredged material. Id. at
925.
132. Id. at 923-25.
133. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Regulatory Guidance Letter 90-5: Landclearing
Activities Subject to Section 404 Jurisdiction (July 18, 1990). The Corps detailed the types
of activities that, in its view, were regulatory discharges in its discussion of its proposed
1993 revision of the regulations. Further Revisions to the Clean Water Act Regulatory
Definition of "Discharge of Dredged Material," 65 Fed. Reg. 50,108, 50,111-13 (Aug. 16,
2000).
134. Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg.
41,206,41,232 (Nov. 13, 1986); see also Memorandum from the United States Army Corps
of Engineers, (Mar. 29, 1985) (interpreting the Avoyelles decision) (on file with the North
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minimus" exception was challenged in a lawsuit filed by a number of
environmental groups. 135 The Corps and EPA settled the litigation by
agreeing to promulgate stiffer rules for landclearing and excavation
activities in wetlands. 36 The new regulations, issued in 1993,
expanded the definition of "discharge" to include
any addition, including any redeposit, of dredged material,
including excavated material, into the waters of the United
States which is incidental to any activity, including
mechanized landclearing, ditching, channelization, or other
excavation.1 37
This became known as the Tulloch rule.
2. National Mining and the Tulloch Rule
Industry groups immediately challenged the Tulloch rule on the
ground that it exceeded the statutory authority of the Corps.138 In
National Mining Ass'n v. United States Army Corps of Engineers,
1 39
the plaintiffs argued that incidental fallback, which occurs when
Carolina Law Review).
135. In North Carolina Wildlife Federation v. Tulloch, No. C-90-713-CIV-5-BO
(E.D.N.C. 1992), a number of environmental groups sued the Corps because the Corps
determined that a developer did not need to obtain a section 404 permit for activities
associated with clearing and draining 700 acres of forested wetlands in eastern North
Carolina. Id.; see also Clean Water Act Regulatory Programs, 58 Fed. Reg. 45,008, 45,008
(Aug. 25,1993).
136. See Clean Water Act Regulatory Programs, 58 Fed. Reg. 45008 (Aug. 25,
1993) (describing the settlement agreement).
137. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(1)(iii) (1993) (emphasis added). At the same time, the "de
minimus" exception was also rewritten to exclude, as a practical matter, mechanized
landclearing and related activities:
(4) Section 404 authorization is not required for the following:
(i) Any incidental addition, including redeposit, of dredged material
associated with any activity that does not have or would not have the effect of
destroying or degrading an area of waters of the United States as defined in
paragraphs (d)(5) and (d)(6) of this section; however, this exception does not
apply to any person preparing to undertake mechanized landclearing, ditching,
channelization and other excavation activity in a water of the United States,
which would result in a redeposit of dredged material, unless the person
demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Corps, or EPA as appropriate, prior to
commencing the activity involving the discharge, that the activity would not have
the effect of destroying or degrading any area of the waters of the United States,
as defined in paragraphs (d)(5) and (d)(6) of this section. The person proposing
to undertake mechanized landclearing, ditching, channelization or other
excavation activity bears the burden of demonstrating that such activity would
not destroy or degrade any area of waters of the United States.
33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(4)(i) (2000).
138. Am. Mining Cong. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 951 F. Supp. 267, 269
(D.C. Cir. 1997).
139. 145 F.3d 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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material removed from the water is redeposited into virtually the
same location from which it was initially removed, is not a
"discharge" because it does not result in any addition of material to a
wetland,140 and only additions of regulated materials (pollutants)
require a permit under section 404 of the CWA. An example of
incidental fallback would be slurry or soil dropping from the bucket
of a backhoe as it excavates a ditch or channel in a section 404
jurisdictional wetland.' 4' The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit agreed, enjoining the Corps' enforcement of the
rule, and once again the Corps began the process of promulgating
amended regulations.
42
3. The New Tulloch Rule
The Corps gave the National Mining decision the narrowest
possible reading. In the preamble to its May 1999 regulations, the
Corps stated that National Mining did not alter the doctrine that
some redeposits of dredged material constitute discharge and are thus
subject to section 404 jurisdiction.143  The new regulations simply
replaced "any redeposit of dredged material" with "redeposit of
dredged material other than incidental fallback.1 4  Then, in a
footnote, the Corps stated that "[i]ncidental fallback results in the
return of dredged material to virtually the spot from which it
came." 45  Subsequently in January 2001, the Corps amended its
regulations to incorporate this definition with some minor
modifications. 146  The amended regulations also presume that
140. Id. at 1403 (emphasis added).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1404. The district court's nationwide injunction prohibiting the enforcement
of the regulation was affirmed. Id. at 1401; see also Revisions to the Clean Water Act
Regulatory Definition of "Discharge of Dredged Material," 64 Fed. Reg. 25,120, 25,121
(May 10, 1999).
143. Revisions to the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of "Discharge of
Dredged Material," 64 Fed. Reg. 25,120,25,121 (May 10, 1999).
144. Id. at 25,123.
145. Id. at 25,120.
146. The revised rule states:
The Corps and EPA regard the use of mechanized earth-moving equipment
to conduct landclearing, ditching, channelization, in-stream mining or other
earth-moving activity in waters of the United States as resulting in a discharge of
dredged material unless project specific evidence shows that the activity results in
only incidental fallback. This paragraph (i) does not and is not intended to shift
any burden in any administrative or judicial proceeding under the CWA.
Incidental fallback is the redeposit of small volumes of dredged material that
is incidental to excavation activity in waters of the United States when such
material falls back to substantially the same place as the initial removal.
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landclearing and excavation activities result in discharges "unless
project-specific evidence shows that the activity results in only
incidental fallback.' 1 47 As a practical matter, this means that most
landclearing and excavation activities in section 404 jurisdictional
wetlands are subject to section 404 jurisdictional requirements and
that any such project will be closely scrutinized by the Corps.14'
The impact of this regulation may be considerably lessened by
the SWANCC decision. If isolated, non-navigable, wholly intrastate
waters and wetlands are indeed no longer section 404 jurisdictional
waters and wetlands, the Tulloch rule does not apply to any activities
taking place within such areas. That means, absent state regulation or
some other applicable federal legislation, ecological important areas
are now "open for development." The next section of this Article
examines whether North Carolina law provides protection for
isolated, non-navigable, wholly intrastate waters and wetlands. This
is an especially significant question for North Carolina because a
significant percentage of the state's wetlands are classified as such.1
49
Examples of incidental fallback include soil that is distributed when dirt is
shoveled and the back-spill that comes off a bucket when such small volume of
soil or dirt falls into substantially the same place from which it was initially
removed.
33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(2) (2000) (emphasis added). On February 17, 2001, the Bush
Administration ordered the implementation of the regulations to be delayed pending
further study, but later, on April 16, 2001, the Administration announced that it endorsed
the new Tulloch rule. See Mike Allen, EPA Will Toughen Rules On Wetlands; New
Permits Opposed By Builders, WASH. POST, Apr. 17,2001, at A6.
147. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2 (c)(2)(i).
148. Another activity associated with excavation and dredging in wetlands, called
sidecasting, has also prompted litigation pertaining to the Corps' authority under the
CWA. Sidecasting involves the redeposit of dredge material at a point in the wetland, but
away from the original location. Further Revisions to the Clean Water Act Regulatory
Definition of "Discharge of Dredged Material," 66 Fed. Reg. 4550, 4553 (Jan. 17, 2001)
(describing sidecasting and other similar activities that involve "discharges"). In United
States v. Deaton, 209 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 2000), the government sued the Deatons for
violation of sections 301 and 404 of the CWA by sidecasting dredged material as they dug
a drainage ditch through a wetland. The district court awarded summary judgment for the
Deatons, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that sidecasting in a section 404
jurisdictional wetland is the discharge of a pollutant under the CWA. Id. at 337. If soil
can be extracted completely without depositing any dredge material on the side of the
ditch or elsewhere in the wetland, other than incidental fallback, the activity will not be
subject to the CWA permitting requirements. Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. United States Corps
of Eng'rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1404 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The more probable situation, however, is
that any excavation activity in wetlands will produce some discharge and will therefore fall
under review for section 404. See Am. Mining Cong. v. United States Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 120 F. Supp. 2d 23 (D.D.C. 2000) (denying motion challenging the Corps' May 10,
1999 discharge regulation as being inconsistent with the opinion of the court in National
Mining).
149. " '[I]solated waters' are generally construed to be waters that lack a hydrologic
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II. NORTH CAROLINA LAW AND ACrivITIES IN ISOLATED, NON-
NAVIGABLE, FRESHWATER WETLANDS
The Corps' and EPA's authority over activities in wetlands is tied
to the meaning of the term "navigable waters" and whether the
activity is a "discharge of a pollutant." However, the authority of the
EMC, the relevant state entity, is tied to the state statutory definition
of "waters of the state" and whether an activity violates state water
quality standards. The challenges to EMC's authority have centered
around this question: Are all isolated, non-navigable, freshwater
wetlands statutory "waters" of the state? No serious challenge has
been made to EMC's authority over isolated, non-navigable, open
bodies of water, and the discussion in this part of the Article will be
limited to EMC's authority over isolated, non-navigable, freshwater
wetlands. This part of the Article will discuss the history of state
regulation of wetlands activities, the relationship between EMC's
water quality rules and the CWA section 401 certification
requirement, and the statutory basis for EMC's authority. It also
provides an analysis of that authority.
A. The History of State Regulation of Activities in Wetlands
Prior to 1996, state regulation of activities in wetlands areas was
very limited. Three state statutes required permits for certain
activities, and then only in some wetlands areas. First, under the state
"dredge and fill" statute, 150 a state permit is required for dredging and
filling activities in estuarine waters, tidelands, marshlands, or state-
connection to other waters that are part of or adjacent to interstate waters, a tributary
system, or traditionally navigable waters." Bonnie Nevel, Focus on SWANCC, NAT'L
WETLANDS NEWSL. (Environmental Law Institute, Washington, D.C.), Mar.-Apr. 2001, at
2. The percentage of wetlands in North Carolina that are "isolated" is hard to determine
with any accuracy. Some wetlands studies have concentrated on particular types of
wetlands, such as pocosins and Carolina Bays, see, e.g., Curtis J. Richardson, Pocosins: An
Ecological Perspective, 11 WETLANDS 335, 339 (1991) (finding that pocosins comprise
more than fifty percent of North Carolina's freshwater wetlands) or wetlands within the
coastal plain, see, e.g., Gordon E. Cashin et al., supra note 7, at 69 (stating that about
eleven percent of the coastal plain wetlands surveyed were hydrologically isolated). One
report stated that "the majority of North Carolina's wetlands ... [are] palustrine wetlands
(from the Latin word "palus," meaning 'marsh')." NORTH CAROLINA ENVIRONMENTAL
DEFENSE FUND, CAROLINA WETLANDS: OUR VANISHING RESOURCE 13 (1989).
Eleven percent of these palustrine wetlands are described as being hydrologically isolated.
See id. at 14-15, 22-23; UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, NATIONAL WETLANDS
SUMMARY, NORTH CAROLINA WETLANDS RESOURCES 297-300. Depending on how
SWANCC is interpreted, the North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural
Resources estimates that between two percent and sixty-three percent of North Carolina's
wetlands could be affected by the decision. Shiffer, supra note 34.
150. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-229 (1999).
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owned freshwater lakes. 51  Because "marshland" is defined by the
North Carolina General Statutes as "salt marsh or other marsh
subject to the regular or occasional flooding by tides, 152 activities in
freshwater wetlands outside of state-owned lakes do not require a
dredge and fill permit. The reach of the second statute' 53 is even
more limited, targeting only the "dredging, filling, removing or
otherwise altering of 'coastal wetlands.' "5 "Coastal wetlands" are
defined the same as "marshland" in the dredge and fill statute1 55 and,
thus, limited to salt marsh and other marsh subject to regular or
occasional flooding by the tides. The final statute dealing with the
grant or denial of Coastal Area Management Act permits156 overlaps
the other two statutes157 and is generally limited to activities affecting
coastal wetlands.'
The main state regulatory instrument of wetlands protection is
actually through section 401 of the CWA. This section requires that
"[a]ny applicant for a Federal license or permit to conduct any
activity ... which may result in any discharge into ... navigable
waters ... shall provide ... a certification from the State ... that any
such discharge will comply with [state effluent limitations and water
quality standards]."'5 9 If the state denies the certification, the denial
acts as an absolute veto to the issuance of the required federal license
or permit.
Prior to the 1990s, states rarely used the section 401 certification
process as a means of protecting wetlands.1' ° The EPA, however,
151. Id. § 113-229(a).
152. Id. § 113-229(n)(3).
153. Section 113-230(a) of the North Carolina General Statutes authorizes the
Secretary of the Department of Environment, Health, and Natural Resources, with the
approval of the Coastal Resources Commission, to issue orders "prohibiting dredging,
filling, removing or otherwise altering coastal wetlands." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-230(a)
(1999).
154. Id.
155. Id. § 113-230(a) states that "[t]he term 'coastal wetlands' shall mean any marsh as
defined in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-229(n)(3)."
156. The North Carolina Coastal Management Act (CAMA) establishes a
comprehensive coastal management program for the North Carolina coastal zone. N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-100 to -134.3 (1999). CAMA permits are required for development
activities within areas of the coastal zone identified as Areas of Environmental Concern.
See id. § 113A-103(2)-(5); id. § 113A-113; id. § 113A-118(d)(1)-(2).
157. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-120 (a) (1) (1999); id. § 113-120(a)(2).
158. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-120 (1999).
159. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (1994).
160. By applying its "antidegradation policy" to wetlands in 1989, North Carolina took
a limited step in this direction. The antidegradation policy to protect existing uses of
surface waters was part of a regulation adopted by the EMC in 1973. N.C. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 15A, r. 2B.0200 (June 2000). In 1989, this policy was extended to wetlands, but in a
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took the position that section 401 applied to wetlands because
wetlands were "waters of the United States.1161 Beginning in 1990, in
an effort to force states to take a more active role in protecting their
wetlands, EPA mandated that states take steps to include wetlands
within the scope of their required CWA water quality standards. 162
By the end of the fiscal year 1993, states were to include wetlands in
their definition of "state waters," establish beneficial uses for
wetlands, adopt existing narrative and numeric criteria for wetlands,
adopt narrative biological criteria for wetlands, and apply anti-
degradation policies to wetlands.163 In 1996, after a drawn-out,
contentious process,"64 North Carolina finally responded to this
roundabout manner. The regulation allowed the Director of the Division of Water
Quality (DWQ) to authorize activities that would remove existing uses of a freshwater
wetland. In making that determination, the Director would be guided by the policies
followed by the Corps in deciding whether to issue a CWA section 404 permit. N.C.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2B.0109 (June 2000).
161. EPA MEMORANDUM, NATIONAL GUIDANCE: WATER QUALITY STANDARDS
FOR WETLANDS 7 (July 30, 1990).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 4.
164. The EMC began considering wetlands rules in 1992. The DWQ established a
study group to review the proposed rules and make suggestions for revisions. The group
presented revised rules to the EMC's Water Quality Committee in December 1993. The
EMC's Water Quality Committee approved the request to present the rules to the EMC in
1994. Public hearings were held in 1995. Brief of Respondent at 9-10, In re Request for a
Declaratory Ruling by the Environmental Management Commission, No. 99-11706 (Wake
County Superior Court filed Sept. 1, 2000) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
Farmers, state highway officials, timbering interests, mining companies and developers
opposed the adoption of the rules. Stuart Leavenworth, Public Hearings on Wetlands
Preservation Begin Next Week, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 6, 1995, at IA.
The opponents of wetlands regulation also attempted to abort the EMC rule-making
process through a proposed bill, H.B. 886, that would eliminate state jurisdiction over all
wetlands under an acre in size. Douglas N. Rader & Melinda E. Taylor, Wetlands at the
Crossroads, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May 16, 1995, at 9A. The rules faced
continued opposition from the North Carolina Citizens for Business and Industry, a
powerful lobbying group, which claimed the rules would have " 'devastating effects on
development all across North Carolina.'" Stuart Leavenworth, Saving Urban Marshes,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 14, 1995, at 3A. Developers and highway
builders also worked to exclude the filling of small wetlands from any regulation by the
EMC. Editorial, Striking a Blow for Wetlands, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct.
9, 1995, at 10A. On March 14, 1996, the EMC adopted the rules with an effective date of
October 1, 1996. See Brief of Respondent, supra, at 11. The opponents of the rules then
challenged the rules before the Administrative Rules Review Commission. After hearing
from the opponents and supporter of the rules, and after a few minutes of discussion, the
commission decided that the rules were ambiguous and did not conform to the General
Assembly's intent. Stuart Leavenworth, Panel Supports Industry on Wetlands, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), July 19, 1996, at 3A [hereinafter Leavenworth, Panel
Supports Industry]. On September 12, 1996, the EMC voted to file the wetlands rules
notwithstanding the commission's objection. Brief of Respondent, supra, at 11. Shortly
thereafter, a declaratory judgment action was filed in the Wake County Superior Court
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initiative by promulgating water quality standards for its wetlands and
other wetlands rules. 165
B. EMC's Certification and Enforcement Authority
The North Carolina Division of Water Quality (DWQ), the state
entity responsible for implementing EMC's rules, applies these water
quality standards. The DWQ evaluates ditching and other activities
that drain wetlands, granting or denying the section 401 certification
required for section 404 permit applicants. Until the SWANCC
decision put federal regulation of isolated wetlands in jeopardy, the
state's view was that, unless the project requires a federal permit,
neither the EMC nor the DWQ has authority to require prior
approval of ditching and other activities that drain a wetland.1
66
However, the EMC has authority to enforce its water quality
standards against individuals and companies who violate them
irrespective of whether a federal permit or section 401 certification is
required.' 67
(No. 96-13108) (filed Dec. 23, 1996) asserting that the EMC lacked the authority to adopt
the rules. Brief of Respondent, supra, at 11. This action was dismissed in February 1998
because the petitioners had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Id. at 12.
After filing a petition with the EMC for a declaratory ruling and the EMC affirming its
authority to adopt the rules, the petitioners instituted the present action pending before
the Wake County Superior Court. Id.
165. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2B.0231(a) (June 2000) ("The water quality
standards for all wetlands are designed to protect, preserve, restore and enhance the
quality and uses of wetlands and other waters of the state influenced by wetlands.").
166. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.1(a) (1999) (stating the circumstances under which
a permit is needed from the EMC, and that ditching and draining are not included); see
also Letter from Jill Hickey & Kathryn Cooper, North Carolina Attorney General's
Office, to Preston Howard & Steve Tedder, Division of Water Quality, (Dec. 16, 1997)
(advisory letter on the authority of the EMC to regulate the ditching and draining of
wetlands) ("[W]e find no authority for the EMC to require prior approval, i.e. permitting,
of ditching or other activities which drain wetlands, unless the activity requires a federal
permit for which EMC is empowered to issue a 401 certification.") (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter Advisory Letter]. A clarification of the state's position
took place in July 2001. In an oral opinion provided at the July EMC water quality
meeting, the state attorney general's office stated that the EMC had the authority to
establish a permit system regulating discharges, defined in the proposed rule as the
"deposition of dredged or fill material including[,] but not limited to[,] fill, earth,
construction debris and soil." Proposed N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2H.1301(a),
Version 2.6, July 11, 2001. The representative of the attorney general's office stated that a
written opinion would be provided to the EMC prior to its September 2001 meeting. The
1997 opinion letter only addressed the question of whether the EMC could require pre-
activity approval for activities "other than filling, such as ditching or draining." Advisory
Letter, supra (emphasis added).
167. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.6A (1999) (providing for civil penalties); id. § 143-
215.6B (providing for criminal penalties); id. § 143-215.6C (providing for injunctive relief);
see also Advisory Letter, supra note 166 (asserting that the state has authority to assess
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The significance of this enforcement authority became apparent
after the decision in National Mining invalidating the original Tulloch
rule. In late 1998 and early 1999, immediately following that decision,
acting on the assumption that ditching and draining of wetlands no
longer required either a section 404 permit or a section 401
certification, some developers and other property owners in eastern
North Carolina engaged in a frenzy of ditching and draining
thousands of acres of wetlands." To combat these destructive
activities, the State announced it would seek injunctive relief and civil
penalties against any person violating water quality standards in the
process of ditching or draining of wetlands.169 The exercise of this
authority has not gone unchallenged.
civil penalties, seek injunctive relief, and prosecute violators of water quality standards).
168. Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 145 F.3d 1399 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) was handed down in June 1998. In July 1998, the State of North Carolina stated
its intent to seek injunctive relief and civil penalties against anyone violating state water
quality standards or other rules passed under relevant statutes while engaged in
excavation, ditching or draining activities in wetlands areas after October 1, 1998. Poyner
& Spruill, L.L.P., State Signals Intent to Prohibit Excavation Activities In Wetlands, N.C.
ENVTL. LAW LETrER, Sept. 1998, at 1. Subsequently, the implementation date was
changed to March 1, 1999. Poyner & Spruill, L.L.P., Ditching Adjacent To Wetlands May
Now Be Illegal, 9 N.C. ENVTL. LAW LETrER, Dec. 1998, at 1. The stated reason for the
delay was that staff shortages prevented the DWQ from enforcing its rules prior to March
1, 1999. James Eli Shifter, Loophole Leads to Loss of Wetlands, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 5, 1999, at 1A [hereinafter Shiffer, Loophole]. During the perceived
"non-enforcement window" between the decision in National Mining and the stated
implementation of state enforcement efforts in 1999, developers and others rushed to
engage in excavation, landclearing, ditching, and draining activities in southeastern North
Carolina wetlands areas without a full understanding of state policy. Poyner & Spruill,
L.L.P., Division Of Water Quality Revises Wetlands Drainage Policy, N.C. ENvTL. LAW
LETrER, Aug. 1999, at 1. During this window of time, an estimated 4,627 acres of
wetlands were drained in eastern North Carolina. James Eli Shiffer, Coalition Wants End
to Ban on Draining Wetlands, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 8, 1999, at 1A
[hereinafter Shiffer, Coalition]. Initial estimates were much higher, ranging from 9,000 to
20,000 acres. See id.; 3 Brunswick Developers to Pay $213,000 to Fill Ditches, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 29, 1999, at 3A [hereinafter Brunswick Developers]. The
developers and others engaged in these activities subsequently discovered that their
activities violated not only erosion and control rules, but also other state rules. See
Brunswick Developers, supra; see also Shifter, Loophole, supra (concerning violations of
sedimentation rules and water quality rules). In their haste to drain and clear wetlands,
they also violated still valid and enforceable federal section 404 regulations. Regulators
Going After Developers for Improper Wetlands Draining, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), Aug. 30, 1999, at 3A [hereinafter Regulators Going After Developers].
169. Much to their surprise, the developers found themselves the target of both Corps
and state enforcement actions. Although ditching and draining of wetlands was technically
permissible, the developers and property owners found that the methods they used
violated both federal and state regulations. Federal violations resulted because the
activities involved more than incidental discharges; state violations resulted from
violations of state sedimentation regulations.
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C. Are Isolated, Freshwater Wetlands "Waters" of the State?
1. Issues Raised as to the Extent of the EMC's Authority
The extent of EMC's authority to set and enforce water quality
standards for freshwater wetlands has been the subject of
considerable disagreement 70 and the target of litigation pending in
state superior court.17' The dispute is not over whether the EMC has
the statutory authority to apply its water quality standards to some
freshwater wetlands,'72 but whether it has the authority to apply its
water quality standards to all areas that might be classified as
freshwater wetlands. This dispute has two components.
First, under the EMC rules, wetlands are defined as areas
that are inundated or saturated by an accumulation of
surface or ground water at a frequency and duration
sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances
do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for
life in saturated soil conditions. 73
170. See, e.g., Leavenworth, Panel Supports Industry, supra note 164 (reporting that
representatives of industry groups claim that EMC lacks authority to regulate wetlands);
James Eli Shiffer, Panel Retains Ban on Draining Wetlands, NEws & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), Sept. 10, 1999, at 3A. (reporting arguments by representatives of industry groups
before the EMC that the EMC lacks authority to regulate wetlands to the extent it does
under existing regulations).
171. North Carolina Home Builders Ass'n v. Envtl. Mgt. Comm'n, No. 99 CV 11706
(Wake County Superior Court filed Nov. 3,1999).
172. The EMC clearly has statutory authority to apply its water quality rules to some
freshwater wetlands. See infra notes 184-90 and accompanying text. Even those involved
in the current challenges to the EMC rules concede that the EMC has authority over some
wetlands areas. The coalition of developers, builders, farmers, miners, and others accept
the authority of the EMC to regulate "swamps," but assert that not every wetland is a
swamp. Their position is that the EMC lacks the authority to regulate areas without some
permanent open water. See Shiffer, Coalition, supra note 168.
173. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2B.0202 (June 2000). This definition is almost
identical to the one used by the Corps and EPA except for the addition of the words "an
accumulation of." See 40 C.F.R. § 230.41(a)(1) (2000). The addition of those words is
necessitated by the definition of "water" in § 143-212(6). A more scientific and technical
definition of wetlands is:
an ecosystem that depends on constant or recurrent inundation or saturation at
or near the surface of the substrate. The minimum essential characteristics of a
wetland are recurrent, sustained inundation or saturation at or near the surface
and the presence of physical, chemical, and biological features reflective of
recurrent sustained inundation or saturation. Common diagnostic features of
wetlands are hydric soils and hydrophytic vegetation. These features will be
present except where specific physicochemical, biotic, or anthropogenic factors
have removed them or prevented their development.
NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, WETLANDS 3 (1995).
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Under this definition and standard methodology for delineating
wetlands areas, freshwater wetlands range from areas with standing
water all year to those displaying no surface water, but with a water
table within twelve inches of the surface and characterized by wetland
vegetation, such as white cedar and sweet gum trees and high bush
blueberry and similar plant life, and wetlands soils, such as peat.7 4
Thus, EMC's authority depends on whether all isolated wetlands
satisfying these criteria are waters of the State.
The second component of the dispute relates to the SWANCC
decision. Following the narrative description of wetlands contained
in the EMC rule above, the rule concludes by stating that "wetlands
classified as waters of the state are restricted to the waters of the
United States as defined by 33 C.F.R. 328.3." 175  The express
incorporation of the Corps' interstate waters regulation as a
limitation on the definition of state jurisdictional wetlands raises the
question as to whether SWANCC affects not only the Corps'
regulatory authority but also alters the EMC's regulatory authority.
17 6
2. The Source of EMC's Authority Over Isolated Wetlands
The source of EMC's authority is Article 21 of Chapter 143 of
the North Carolina General Statutes. 7 Under this legislation, the
EMC has authority "to develop and adopt... [water quality]
standards applicable to ... each of the waters of the State.' 78 The
statutory definition of "waters" is provided by section 143-212(6) of
the North Carolina General Statutes. Although the term "wetlands"
does not appear in the list of specific types of waters that are
considered "waters of the state," this does not mean that "wetlands"
are not "waters of the state." The absence of the term is a product of
carrying over statutory language formulated in 1951 and evolution of'
the English language. A statutory definition of "waters" first appears
174. See, e.g., NAT'L. RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 173, at 96 (noting that although
the surface may be dry, an area is considered saturated to the surface if the critical water
table depth is twelve inches).
175. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2B.0202(71) (June 2000).
176. The EMC does not believe that the SWANCC decision affects the application of
its wetlands rules. On April 12, 2001, the EMC passed an interpretative ruling that the
EMC rules include all wetlands defined as waters of the United States by federal
regulations at the time the wetlands rules were adopted in 1996 and specifically include
isolated wetlands. EMC Meeting, supra note 34, at 10-11.
177. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-211 to -215.741 (1999).
178. Id. § 143-214.1(a)(1). The authority to set water quality standards for waters of
the state has resided in a state agency since at least 1951. See Act of Apr. 6, 1951, ch. 606,
sec. 1, 1951 N.C. Sess. Laws 530 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-211 to
-215.7 (1999)).
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in the North Carolina General Statutes in 1951, as part of "An Act to
Rewrite Article 21 of Chapter 143 of the General Statutes Relating to
Stream Sanitation."17 9 The definitional section in that earlier Act is
identical to the current section 143-212(6).1o As the General
Assembly rewrote Chapter 143, changing the nature and name of the
state entity responsible for maintaining the quality of North
Carolina's waters and expanding the entity's authority,181 the 1951
definition was carried forward.' When the 1951 definition of
"waters" was written, the term "wetlands" was not a familiar one.
That term did not come into common usage until the latter part of the
twentieth century. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
areas commonly referred to today as wetlands were calied swamps,
bogs, mire, and fen. 8' Therefore, the question is whether the
statutory language from an earlier period in our state's history is
179. Act of Apr. 6, 1951, ch. 606, 1951 N.C. Sess. Laws 530 (codified as amended at
N.C. GEN STAT. §§ 143-211 to -215.7 (1999)).
180. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-212(6) (1999).
181. The first major overhaul of the 1951 Act was the 1967 Act to Create a Board of
Water and Air Resources and to Define Its Duties and Powers Relating to Water and Air
Pollution and Control and Water Resource Management. Act of June 22, 1967, ch. 892,
sec. 1, 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws 1144 (1967) (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-
211 to -215.9 (1999)). The 1951 language was carried over in this legislation. In 1973, as
part of a governmental reorganization, a new entity was created to replace the Board of
Water Resources, established by the 1967 act. The new entity was the Environmental
Management Commission. Act of May 22, 1973, ch. 686, see. 1, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 1020
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-77(9) (1999)). In subsequent sessions, the
legislature made other technical modifications of the applicable statutes, but never to the
definition of "waters."
182. Thus, the definition of "waters" in 143-212(6) predates the CWA, which was
passed in 1972, and general public awareness of the importance of wetlands systems. In
fact, in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, North Carolina, as did many other
states, promoted the drainage of swamps and wetlands for cultivation purposes. See, eg.,
State ex rel. Rhodes v. Simpson, 325 N.C. 514, 519-20, 385 S.E.2d 329, 332-33 (1989)
(holding that the filling of a marsh was not a nuisance at common law); Beer v. Whiteville
Lumber Co., 170 N.C. 337, 340, 86 S.E. 1024, 1025 (1915) (stating that "swamp lands may
be defined as those too wet for cultivation and requiring drainage to fit them for that
purpose"); 1909 N.C. Sess. Laws 442 (stating that "drainage of swamps and the drainage of
the surface water from agricultural lands ... shall be considered a public benefit"); see also
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 156-1 to -36 (1999) (discussing obtaining a right of drainage across the
land of an adjoining landowner). This legislation can be traced back to 1795. 1795 N.C.
Sess. Laws, 3.7.
183. See, e.g., NAT'L. RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 173, at 43 (discussing the
nineteenth-century federal Swamp and Overflowed Lands Acts). A WESTLAW search
for the period prior to 1955 did not reveal one case in which the term was used. Prior to
1963, the term "wetlands" appeared only in one decided case, Madeo v. McGuire, 192
N.Y.S.2d 936 (1959). The case did not raise any environmental issues, but only the
question of whether offshore islands and wetlands, which were not part of a school district,
could be annexed into an existing school district. Id. at 939.
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adequate to permit the EMC to issue water quality rules for areas
which today are commonly called "wetlands."
3. The Statutory Meaning of "Waters"
The relevant portion of section 143-212(6) states that "waters"
include "any ... swamp ... or other body or accumulation of water,
whether surface or underground."'184 The term "swamp" is not
defined in the statute, but it has a very specific meaning in North
Carolina law. In 1891, in an act reaffirming that title to, and the
authority to dispose of, state-owned swamp lands was vested in the
State Board of Education, 5 the General Assembly declared that
swamp lands and marsh meant "all those lands which have been or
may now be known and called 'swamp' or 'marsh' lands, 'pocosin
bay,' 'briary bay' and 'savanna.' ",186 Later, in 1915, in Beer v.
Whiteville Lumber Company,'1' the North Carolina Supreme Court
said that "[s]wamp lands may be defined as those too wet for
cultivation and requiring drainage to fit them for that purpose."",,
These definitions of swamp are likely those that the General
Assembly had in mind when, in 1951, it first enacted section 143-
212(6) and included "swamp[s]" within the term "waters."'8 9 This
conclusion is supported by later action of the General Assembly. In
1959, when it amended the state statutes governing disposal of state-
owned lands, it incorporated the Beer definition into North Carolina
General Statute section 146-64(8). In the latter statute,
"'[s]wamplands' means lands too wet for cultivation except by
drainage, and includes ... [a]l state lands which have been or are
known as 'swamp' or 'marsh' lands, 'pocosin bay,' 'briary bay' or
'savanna.' "190
184. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-212(6) (1999).
185. An act to define the words "swamp lands" as the same are employed in the
statutes of this state in respect to the entry and grant of lands and the lands appropriated
and belonging to the State Board of Education, 1891 N.C. Sess. Laws 302. This statute can
be traced back to 1822. See 1822 N.C. Sess. Laws 30 (closing all state-owned swamp land
and marshland to appropriation by private individuals under the general entry and grant
statute).
186. Id.
187. 170 N.C. 337,86 S.E. 1024 (1915).
188. Id. at 340,86 S.E. at 1025.
189. Section 143-212(6) was first enacted in 1951 as part of An Act to Rewrite Article
21 of Chapter 43 of the General Statutes Relating to Stream Sanitation. Act of Apr. 6,
1951, ch. 606, sec. 1, 1951 N.C. Sess. Laws 530 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 143-211 to -215.7 (1999)).
190. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-64(8) (1999). The history of this statute can be traced back
to 1822, when the state closed all state-owned swampland and marshland to appropriation
by private individuals under the general entry and grant statute. 1822 N.C. Sess. Laws 30.
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Swamps, some of which are isolated and non-navigable, are a
type of freshwater wetlands. So the EMC certainly has authority over
at least some types of isolated freshwater wetlands. The difficult
question is whether statutory "waters" include those areas in which
wetlands vegetation grows due to saturated soil conditions, but in
which there is little, if any, surface water. If such areas are to be
included within "waters of the state," it is because they are either
"swamp[s]" or "accumulations of... water, surface or underground"
within the meaning of the statute. 9'
Both the 1891 and the 1959 definitions show that the General
Assembly intended to include such areas within the term "swamp"
when it enacted section 143-212(6). The 1891 and 1959 definitions
identify a number of specific types of areas as "swamp[s]" or
"swamplands." Included within the term "swamp" are "pocosins,"
which is a term that is used "to describe a variety of bog and swamp
ecosystems and not to delineate a single class of wetlands."'192 Surface
water is not present in all pocosins. Some pocosins consist of only
seasonally saturated soils and wetlands vegetation.193 Similarly, the
word "bay" refers to Carolina Bays, which are shallow, ovate-shaped
depressions found on the coastal plain of North Carolina and other
Southeastern states. 94 Some Carolina Bays may not display surface
water, but may only be seasonally saturated by groundwater. 95 And
the term "savanna" refers to pine savannas, which are seasonally
saturated by a high groundwater table.196 Therefore, in using the
word "swamp" in 1951 and retaining it in later legislation, the
However, the definition of swamplands was not included until 1959. 1959 N.C. Sess. Laws
612 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 146-1 to -84 (1999)). This would also
strongly suggest that earlier in 1951, when the General Assembly used the term swamp, it
had in mind the same Beer definition.
191. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-212(6) (1999).
192. Curtis J. Richardson & J. Whitfield, Pocosins, Carolina Bays, and Mountain Bogs,
in BIODIVERSITY OF THE SOUTHEAST UNITED STATES: LOWLAND TERRESTRIAL
COMMUNITIES 257,260 (William Martin et al., eds., 1993). Carolina Bays and bay forests
or bay swamps are similar to pocosins in that each contains similar trees, shrub vegetation,
and fauna. Different geological conditions, however, created each of these ecosystems.
Richardson, supra note 149, at 337. About seventy percent (700,000 acres) of the nation's
pocosins are located in the coastal plain of eastern North Carolina. UNITED STATES
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 149, at 298.
193. Richardson & Whitfield, supra note 192, at 268.
194. Id. at 261-63.
195. Id. at 261-63, 269. In fact, the term pocosin has been used synonymously with
Carolina Bay.
196. NORTH CAROLINA ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, supra note 149, at 19;
NATIONAL WETLANDS SUMMARY, supra note 149, at 299. Pine savannas support orchids
and plants, such as Venus flytrap, pitcher plants, and sundew. Id. at 298-99.
2001] 1707
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
General Assembly had in mind a number of wetlands areas that do
not contain surface waters but are saturated seasonally by
groundwater. 197
In addition, the use of the words "or other ... accumulation of
water, surface or underground" in section 143-212(6) of the North
Carolina General Statutes can also be read as indicating the General
Assembly intended to include within "waters" other areas
characterized by saturated soils that may not be formally known as
"pocosins," "bays," or "savanna." One such area would be "seepage
bogs," the surface of which is kept marshy at least seasonally by
groundwater.1 8  On the other hand, it could be argued that the
"accumulation of ... [underground] water" language was directed at
wells and underground aquifers.199 Based on that interpretation, one
might argue that the EMC lacks the specific authority required to
promulgate rules covering isolated freshwater wetlands in which no
surface water is present.2° But the stated legislative purpose of the
1951 Act was that:
the water resources of the State shall be prudently utilized in
the best interest of the people .... The maintenance of the
quality of the water resources requires the creation of an
agency ... to protect the water requirement for health,
recreation, fishing, agriculture, industry, and animal life.2"1
In conjunction with the catchall provision "accumulation of water,
surface or underground," this statement can be read as reflecting a
specific legislative purpose of protecting all water resources of the
State, and not only those specifically listed by name. Indeed, the
General Assembly could be credited with the foresight that other
water resources of the state, the importance or even the existence of
which may not have been apparent at that time, should be protected
and were specifically intended to be gathered into any regulatory
structure by the catchall language2m Today, we are aware of the
197. Id. at 298-99.
198. NORTH CAROLINA ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, supra note 149, at 22.
199. See Jordan v. Foust Oil Co., 116 N.C. App. 155, 447 S.E.2d 491 (1994). The case
involved the North Carolina Oil Pollution and Hazardous Substances Act, 1973 N.C. Sess.
Laws 534 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.83 (1999)), which also
contains the accumulation language. Id. The court held that the plaintiffs' well
constituted "waters of the State." Id. at 160,447 S.E.2d at 494.
200. Under the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act, an agency may not
adopt a rule that "[i]mplements or interprets a law unless that law or another law
specifically authorizes the agency to do so." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-19(1) (1999).
201. Act of Apr. 6, 1951, ch. 606, sec. 1, 1951 N.C. Sess. Laws 530 (codified as amended
at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-211 to -215.7 (1999)).
202. As the North Carolina Court of Appeals said in Wagoner v. Hiatt, 111 N.C. App.
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importance of wetlands areas and realize that the presence or absence
of water at the surface is not indicative of a wetlands area's ecological
significance. Therefore, the "or other ... accumulations of water,
surface or underground" language should be read as specific
authority and as broad enough to include many isolated, freshwater
wetlands that do not qualify as swamps and in which surface water is
not present.
Admittedly, one could argue that when the General Assembly
has chosen to include wetlands within the ambit of legislation, it has
done so using the term "wetlands." One example of many such
intentional uses of the term "wetlands" 203 is section 143-215.77(18) of
the North Carolina General Statutes, the definition section of the Oil
Pollution and Hazardous Substances Control Act.P Among other
things, this Act requires permits from the EMC for the discharge of
any oil or hazardous substance "into the waters of... [the] State." 205
The definition of "waters" for purposes of this Act is significant
because, in 1989, the General Assembly amended the definitional
section, specifically identifying "wetlands" along with "swamp[s]" as
waters of the State. The definitional section also contains the catch-
all phrase "or any other ... accumulation of water, surface or
underground." Based on this, one might argue that "wetlands" are
distinct from "swamp[s] .. . [and] any other body or accumulations of
water, surface or underground."2 6 However, assuming that in earlier
statutes "waters" that we now refer to as "wetlands" were classified as
"swamp[s]" or "other... accumulation of water," by 1989, the word
"wetlands" was deeply imbedded in our national vocabulary and at
the center of the ongoing dialogue about protecting ecologically
important areas. The inclusion of the term in this later legislation
could just as easily be read as a legislative intent to emphasize both
the inclusion of "wetlands" in the waters of the state and as a
statement of their ecological importance, and not as a statement that
wetlands were something newly added to the list.0
448, 450, 432 S.E.2d 417, 418 (1993), "The best indica of the legislative purpose are the
language of the [Aict and what the [A]ct seeks to accomplish."
203. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 104E-26 (1999) (licensing low-level radioactive waste
facilities); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-77.9 (1999) (concerning the acquisition of lands with
funds from the National Heritage Trust Fund); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-230 (containing an
order to control activities in coastal wetlands); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-214.8 to -214.14
(1999) (creating the Wetlands Restoration Program).
204. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.75 (1999).
205. Id. § 143-215.83(c).
206. Id. § 143-215.77(18).
207. A contrary interpretation would mean that every time the General Assembly
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Four additional arguments can be made in support of
"wetlands," as defined by the EMC, being considered "waters of the
State." First, in 1996, the General Assembly failed to enact bills
specifically aimed at removing wetlands from the EMC's
jurisdiction.0°8 Although there are many reasons why the legislature
may fail to pass legislation, arguably this is some evidence of the
legislature's understanding that the EMC had authority over wetlands
under the existing definition of "waters." Second, later in 1996, the
North Carolina Rules Commission, an administrative body created by
the legislature to review agency regulations, 2 9 objected to the EMC's
new wetlands regulations1 0 and sent the regulations back to the EMC
for reconsideration.2 11 The EMC reaffirmed its regulation.2 During
the interim, the General Assembly, aware of this disagreement,
passed legislation specifically authorizing the EMC to issue section
401 certifications,213 but did nothing affecting the EMC's authority
over wetlands. Third, the 1989 amendment of the North Carolina Oil
Pollution and Hazardous Substance Control Act to specifically
include wetlands is further evidence of legislative intent to protect
such areas.2 4 In light of this history and current concerns about the
loss of wetlands, a conclusion that "waters" includes isolated
"wetlands" would not be unwarranted. Finally, with the possible
withdrawal of federal regulatory protection as a result of the
SWANCC decision, the inability of the DWQ to apply the EMC
water quality standards to ditching and draining of any isolated, non-
navigable, wholly intrastate wetlands would leave ecologically
specifically included a matter in a subsequent similar statutory definition that was
presumably covered by a catchall provision, the argument would be made that the now
specifically identified matter was never within the catch-all provision in the first place.
208. In May 1996, House Bill 1251 was introduced. One section of the bill would have
overridden the EMC wetlands rules. The bill was referred to the Committee on
Appropriations and, in June 1996, consideration of the bill was postponed indefinitely.
See Brief of Respondent, supra note 164, at 11 (describing the adoption of the EMC's
wetland rules and the General Assembly's actions with respect to these rules).
209. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-2(ld) (1999); Id. §§ 150B-21.8 to -21.16.
210. Leavenworth, Panel Supports Industry, supra note 164. The lobbyists and lawyers
appearing before the Commission argued that the EMC lacked the authority over
wetlands because wetlands were not statutory "waters of the State." The Commission did
not pass on the validity of that argument. Id.
211. Id.
212. In September 1996, the EMC upheld its rules, and they became effective on
October 1,1996. Brief of Respondent, supra note 164, at 11.
213. Act of Aug. 3, 1996, ch.18, sec. 27.4, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 846 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-215.10A, 143-215.10B(4), 90A-47.3(b), 106-805(5),
143-215.114(a)(g) (1999)).
214. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.77(18) (1999).
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important areas215 subject to destructive activities. Judging from what
happened in 1998 and early 1999, such activities will take place very
quickly 16 That would be a tragedy for the state.
D. The Effect of the Incorporation of Federal Wetlands Regulations
in EMC's Wetlands Rules
The EMC rule also states that "[w]etlands classified as waters of
the state are restricted to the waters of the United States as defined by
33 CFR 328.3.' 217 Thus, the rule equates North Carolina
jurisdictional wetlands with those areas that also satisfy federal
jurisdictional wetlands requirements.1 8 But assuming the EMC has
statutory authority to apply its water quality standards to isolated
freshwater wetlands, the question is whether the methodology used to
identify and delineate areas as federal jurisdictional wetlands results
in classifying areas as "waters of the United States" that are not
swamps or accumulations of surface or underground water within the
meaning of the state statute.
215. These areas include pocosins, Carolina Bays, pine savannas, mountain bogs, and
other isolated waters and wetlands. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. For
descriptions of the ecological importance of these areas, see UNITED STATES
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 149, at 297-99; Raymond D. Semlitsch, Size Does
Matter: The Value of Small Isolated Wetlands, NAT'LWETLANDS NEWSL. (Environmental
Law Institute, Washington, D.C.), Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 5.
216. In October 1998, following the federal court decision in National Mining, which
invalidated the then-existing Corps regulation defining "discharge," the State announced
it would postpone a ban on wetlands draining until March 1, 1999. North Carolina
developers and property owners rushed to ditch and drain wetlands, especially in eastern
North Carolina. James Eli Shiffer, State Takes Strict Action on Drained Wetlands, NEWS
& OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 9, 1999, at 3A [hereinafter Shiffer, State Takes Strict
Action]. After taking aerial photographs, the state estimated that 5,627 acres of wetlands
were destroyed. Shiffer, Coalition, supra note 168. Following this ditching and draining
activity, the State took enforcement action against those individuals and companies that in
their haste to ditch and drain, failed to comply with state sediment control regulations.
Shiffer, State Takes Strict Action, supra.
217. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2B.0202(71) (June 2000) (emphasis added). The
sentence in the regulation ends with "and 40 C.F.R. 230.3." Id. 40 C.F.R. § 230.3 is the
EPA regulation that corresponds to section 328.3 of the Corps regulations. The wording
of 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (2000) and 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(3) (2000) is identical. See 33
C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (2000); 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(3) (2000).
218. The EMC would qualify this statement. Its current view is that North Carolina
jurisdictional wetlands are identical to those areas classified as federal jurisdictional
wetlands as of the time in 1996 when the EMC wetlands rules were adopted. See supra
notes 34, 176 (discussing the April 12, 2001, EMC interpretive ruling to this effect).
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1. Delineation of Wetlands Using Federal Wetlands Delineation
Criteria
Although the federal regulations and state rules identify
wetlands as "waters," neither the regulations nor the rules spell out in
detail how wetlands areas are to be identified and delineated.219
Because North Carolina's role in wetlands regulation has been
limited to certifying under section 401 of the CWA that a proposal by
an applicant for a federal permit is consistent with state water quality
standards, and federal permit applications for projects involving
wetlands are evaluated by the Corps under section 404 of the CWA,
the State has deferred to the Corps' determination of whether an area
is a federal and state jurisdictional wetlandY0  Identification and
delineation of specific wetlands areas is left to field personnel who are
guided in that task by the 1987 Corps wetlands delineation manual.
The manual states what specific hydrological features, wetland
vegetation, and soil conditions must exist in an area in order to
classify it as a wetlandY1  According to the manual, an area displays
wetland hydrology if the water table is within twelve inches of the
surface for five percent of the growing season,2" which is
approximately fourteen days in North Carolina.' If such areas
219. 33 C.F.R. § 323.3(b) states:
[t]he term "wetlands" means those areas that are inundated or saturated by
surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and
that under normal conditions do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically
adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps,
marshes, bogs, and similar areas.
33 C.F.R. § 323.3(b) (2000). The wording of the EMC regulation is virtually identical to 33
C.F.R. § 323.3(b). See supra note 165 and accompanying text. The EPA definition of
wetlands is identical to that of the Corps. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(t) (2000). However, the
EPA regulations also include a general description of wetland vegetation types. See 40
C.F.R. § 230.41(a)(3) (2000).
220. At the present time, the DWQ does not delineate wetlands for purposes of
evaluating certifications.
221. See FEDERAL MANUAL FOR IDENTIFYING AND DELINEATING JURISDICTIONAL
WETLANDS 9-10 (1987).
222. The manual states that "an area has wetland hydrology if it is inundated or
saturated to the surface continuously for at least five percent of the growing season in
most years (fifty percent probability of recurrence). These areas are wetlands if they also
meet hydrophytic vegetation and hydric soil requirements." Id. at 30. The saturation to
the surface requirement is in fact satisfied if the soil saturation is within twelve inches of
the surface. The manual states that "[rior soil saturation to impact vegetation, it must
occur with a major portion of the root zone (usually within 12 inches of the surface) of the
prevalent vegetation." Id. at 32.
223. The period of time is determined on a county-by-county basis, using soil tables for
the particular county and may vary by one or two days in the different counties that
comprise the eastern North Carolina coastal plain. Telephone Interview with staff
member, United States Army Corps of Engineers, Wilmington District (Apr. 2,2001). As
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support a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in
saturated soil conditions, then the areas are wetlands 4
The question is whether all areas meeting the Corps' delineation
requirement for wetlands are statutory "waters of the state." The
argument could be made that the Corps definition is too broad and
includes areas that are not "waters of the state." However, since the
general descriptive criteria of wetlands in the EMC rule must be
applied in some fashion to particular areas, each with its own
distinctive characteristics, the area's hydrology, vegetation, and soil
criteria must be established through measurements and the use of
indicators? 5  This requires scientific expertise. The EMC's
acceptance of delineations of wetlands using the Corps delineation
manual should be accorded some deference by the courts.
Traditionally, the interpretation of a statute by an agency created to
administer it is afforded some deference. 6  This is especially true
when the question is one requiring a certain degree of scientific
expertise?227 Therefore, the EMC should be permitted to accept the
Corps delineations of wetlands for purposes of determining whether
an area is a "water of the state."
2. The Effect of SWANCC Upon The EMC's Wetlands Rules
Finally, because the EMC's rule defines "wetlands" as limited to
"waters of the United States" as defined by 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3),
the impact of SWANCC must be explored to determine the limits of
a general matter, the Corps' rule of thumb is that, in the absence of specific regional data
to the contrary, the threshold for duration of saturation can be approximated as fourteen
days during the growing season in most years. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note
173, at 5.
224. See supra notes 173-74,222-23.
225. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 173, at 63.
226. See, e.g., N.C. Bankers Ass'n, Inc. v. N.C. Credit Union Comm'n, 302 N.C. 458,
466, 276 S.E.2d 404, 410 (1981) (noting that an agency's interpretation of a statute it was
created to administer is entitled to some deference but is not binding).
227. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-34(a) (Supp. 2000) (mandating that administrative law
judges shall give "due regard to the demonstrated knowledge and expertise of the
agency"); see also, e.g., Charles E. Daye, Powers of Administrative Law Judges, Agencies,
and Courts: An Analytical Empirical Assessment, 79 N.C. L. REv. 1571, 1593-94, 1600
(2001) (arguing that on issues an agency was created to resolve and was provided with
resources to acquire a special competence, the court should accord some deference to
agency decisions); see also United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121,
134 (1985) ("In view of... the inherent difficulties of defining precise bounds to regulable
waters, the Corps' ecological judgment about the relationship between waters and their
adjacent wetlands provides an adequate basis for a legal judgment that adjacent wetlands
may be defined as waters under the Act.").
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EMC's authority.' In order for an intrastate wetland to be a "water
of the United States," a nexus with interstate commerce is required. 29
Therefore, jurisdictional wetlands of the state arguably are also only
those that satisfy that interstate commerce connection. Not every
area that meets the hydrological, soil, and vegetation criteria for a
wetland is a "water of the United States" or a "water of the state."
On one hand, the linkage to the federal requirements means that
insignificant wetlands areas are not "waters of the State." On the
other hand, the linkage presents the question of just how closely the
state definition is tied to the evolving federal standards for what
wetlands are "waters of the United States." If SWANCC means that
isolated, non-navigable, wholly intrastate waters are not "waters of
the United States," then arguably such areas are no longer wetlands
for purposes of this rule. If so, such areas are not subject to EMC's
wetlands water quality standards. The opposing view is that the EMC
rule incorporates the definition of waters of the United States as of
the time the rule was adopted, which predates the SWANCC
decision." Under that view, SWANCC has no effect on the meaning
of "waters of the United States" for purpose of determining what
areas are "wetlands" subject to state water quality standards."1 The
former interpretation appears to be better grounded in the history of
the rule, but the history of the rule?2 is not determinative.
228. The North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act contains a provision for
incorporating material by reference in an administrative rule, but the statute does not
provide an answer to the question of whether the change in interpretation of the federal
regulation affects the interpretation of the state rule. The state statute provides that: "An
agency may incorporate the following material by reference in a rule without repeating the
text of the reference material ... (2) All or part of a ... regulation adopted by ... the
federal government." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-21.6 (1999). The statute continues, "In
incorporating by reference, the agency must designate in the rule whether or not the
incorporation includes subsequent amendments and editions of the referenced material."
Id. Despite the statute's directive, the EMC rule does not state whether the incorporation
includes subsequent amendments of the federal rule. Arguably, without such a statement,
the assumption is that the rule does not incorporate subsequent amendments. This seems
to be agency practice: to make a designation only if it is intended that a rule incorporate
subsequent amendments and editions of referenced material. But beyond that, the statute
really does not address the issue presented. The statute addresses amendments of
incorporated regulations but does not address the effect of changes in the interpretation of
an incorporated regulation. Furthermore, the administrative record developed when the
rule was adopted states that the rule incorporates the definition of wetlands as currently
defined and the scope of the rule will not increase or decrease in the future.
229. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (2000).
230. See EMC Meeting, supra note 34, at 10.
231. Id. at 8, 10.
232. See infra notes 232-35 and accompanying text.
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The State's water quality rules were, as discussed above, a
response to EPA's initiative requiring states to develop water quality
standards for wetlands for purposes of issuing CWA section 401
certifications. When questions were raised as to EMC's authority to
establish classifications and water quality standards for wetlands, the
North Carolina Attorney General's office issued an advisory opinion
confirming the EMC's authority and emphasizing that "[s]ection 401
of the federal Clean Water Act requires the State to certify that any
federally permitted activity that impacts North Carolina waters,
including wetlands, will not result in a violation of state water quality
standards. '1233 The centrality of the section 401 certification process to
the application of EMC water quality standards to wetlands areas is
apparent and appears to be the underlying reason for limiting
"wetlands" to those subject to federal regulatory permit
requirements.' If SWANCC means that isolated, non-navigable,
wholly intrastate wetlands are not "waters of the United States,"
then, absent a discharge of ditched material or drainage water into
some other "waters of the United States," neither a federal permit
nor a section 401 certification is required for the ditching or draining
of wetlands. Absent the need for a section 401 certification, there is
no historical justification for the application of state water quality
standards to wetlands that are no longer subject to CWA
requirements. The EMC may amend its rules to specifically cover
isolated wetlands. Unless the EMC adopts emergency rules,
235
however, the process of adopting a new, expanded definition of
wetlands will probably take a year.236
The State, of course, is entitled to make its own interpretation of
the meaning of incorporating 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3). On April 12,
233. EMC Wetlands Rulemaking Authority, Advisory Opinion of Att'y Gen. (Mar. 21,
1995), at http://www.jus.state.nc.us/Irframe.htm.
234. The incorporation of the Corps' and EPA's regulations may be related to the fact
that, under the CWA, the Corps may issue general permits to conduct activities in certain
section 404 jurisdictional wetlands. In a highly controversial nationwide permit,
Nationwide Permit 26, an individual permit from the Corps was not required for activities
in isolated wetlands of less than ten acres. However, the state 401 certification was still
required by the CWA. By incorporating the Corps' and EPA's definition of "waters of the
United States" into the state definition of wetlands, the State continued to have a veto
over activities that violated state water quality standards, even though the activities were
permissible under section 404 by reason of the general nationwide permit. Nationwide
Permit 26 expired on June 5, 2000. See Final Notice of Issuance and Modification of
Nationwide Permits, 65 Fed. Reg. 12,818,12,818 (Mar. 9, 2000).
235. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-21.1 (2000) (describing the procedure for adopting a
temporary or emergency rule).
236. Poyner & Spruill, L.L.P., The Wetlands Puzzle, N.C. ENVTL. LAW LETTER, June
1999, at 1.
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2001, the EMC unanimously reaffirmed its wetlands rules, stating that
the rules applied to isolated waters and wetlands. 37  An
administrative agency's interpretation of its own rules is entitled to
some deference,238 perhaps more so than an agency's interpretation of
a statute.239 However, if SWANCC is given a broad reading,
continuing to include isolated, non-navigable, wholly intrastate
wetlands within the EMC's rules would mean they are grounded on a
judicially discarded aspect of the CWA.
But those water quality standards are part of state law now, and,
unless the State changes its position on the enforcement of those
standards,240 developers and property owners should act with extreme
caution. Assuming that the EMC does have statutory authority to
regulate certain activities in isolated wetlands, but the Corps does not
have authority to issue section 404 permits for such activities in these
areas, any person seeking to engage in such activities will be in a
regulatory "no man's land." If the Corps lacks section 404
jurisdiction, neither a 404 permit nor a section 401 certification is
required. But that means that under existing EMC rules, no
procedure exists for persons seeking to engage in the ditching or
draining of isolated wetlands to get pre-approval of, or a permit
authorizing, the activity as consistent with state water quality
standards. The EMC's pre-approval role is limited to issuing section
401 certifications.241 Individuals violating EMC's water quality
237. Shiffer, supra note 34.
238. See, e.g., Britt v. N.C. Sheriffs Educ. and Training Standards Comm'n, 348 N.C.
573, 576, 501 S.E.2d 75, 77 (1998) ("[I]nterpretation of regulation by an agency created to
administer that regulation is traditionally accorded some deference by appellate courts.").
239. An agency's interpretation of a statute it administers is entitled to substantial
deference. See, e.g., Shealy v. Associated Transp., Inc., 252 N.C. 738, 742, 114 S.E.2d 702,
705 (1960) (holding agency interpretation to be "strongly persuasive"); Petition of
Vanderbilt University, 252 N.C. 743, 747, 114 S.E.2d 655, 658 (1960) (stating that agency
interpretations ordinarily will be considered "prima facie correct").
240. In a January 22, 2001, e-mail message to the DWQWETLANDS listserv, the
North Carolina 401 Wetlands Unit stated:
The N.C. Division of Water Quality will seek an advisory opinion from the NC
Attorney General's office with respect to the effect (if any) of... [the SWANCC]
decision on NC's water quality and wetlands standards. Until that opinion is
provided (and until the Corps of Engineers also sorts out the implications of this
decision for the 404 Program), DWQ expects that permitting and protection will
continue as normal. Posting of Cyndi Karoly, cyndi.karoly@ncmail.net, to
dwqwetlands@egroups.com (Jan. 22, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
241. Additionally, in 1997 the North Carolina Attorney General's office stated that the
EMC had "no authority ... to require prior approval, i.e. permitting, of ditching or other
activities which drain wetlands, unless the activity requires a federal permit for which the
EMC is empowered to issue a 401 certification." Advisory Letter, supra note 166. But see
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standards in the process of ditching or draining wetlands, however,
are subject to civil and criminal penalties and injunctive relief 4
2
Therefore, anyone engaging in such activities runs the risk of
subsequent state action claiming violations of state water quality
standards.
E. The Proposed EMC Permitting Program for Isolated Wetlands
In order to close any regulatory gap created by the SWANCC
decision and to provide developers and other property owners with a
procedure to obtain pre-approval of projects consistent with state
wetlands standards, in July 2001 the Water Quality Committee of the
EMC proposed the adoption of rules to establish a permit system for
"discharges" into isolated waters not subject to regulation under the
section 404 program.2 43 According to the proposed rule, "discharge"
means "the deposition of dredged or fill material including[,] but not
limited to[,] fill, earth, construction debris and soil."' 4 The stated
authority for such a permit system is the statutory requirement of an
EMC permit for the discharge of "any waste" into waters of the State
in violation of applicable state water quality standards 45 Waste is
broadly defined in the statutes.2 46 A permit system based on this
authority would circumvent an earlier state Attorney General letter
stating that the EMC lacked authority to require pre-approval or
permitting of ditching and draining activities in wetlands.247 The
proposed permit system is not directed at "ditching," but rather at
supra note 233 and accompanying text (discussing the position taken by the Attorney
General's office that the EMC has such authority to regulate certain discharges into
isolated wetlands).
242. See supra note 167. EMC's water quality standards protect existing uses of
classified waters, including wetlands. See N.C. ADMIN CODE tit. 15A, r. 2B.0201 (Jan.
2001). The standards for assuring the maintenance or enhancement of existing uses of
wetlands are set forth in title 15A, rule 2B.0231 of the North Carolina Administrative
Code.
243. Proposed N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2H.1301(a) states that the provisions of
the rule apply to "isolated wetlands and isolated classified water surface waters." Isolated
is defined as having "no visible surface water connection to downstream waters of the
state." N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2H.1301(b). Activities that result in a regulated
discharge may be authorized by the issuance of either an individual permit or Certificate
of Coverage to operate under a general permit. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r.
2H.1301(c). The standards applied in determining whether to authorize a regulated
discharge are set forth in title 15A, rule 2H.1305 of the North Carolina Administrative
Code.
244. Proposed N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2H.1301(a), Version 26, July 11,2001.
245. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.1(a)(6) (1999).
246. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-212(18)(c) (1999).
247. Advisory Letter, supra note 166.
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"discharges" that violate applicable water quality standards.
Discharges that are consistent with applicable water quality standards
and meet conditions of the rules would be permitted.2
Whether these new rules will be adopted by the EMC remains to
be seen. Action on the proposal was deferred until the September
2001 meeting. By that time, nine new members may be appointed to
the seventeen-member commission.249  The identity and views of
these future members are currently unknown.
Even if new rules are adopted, it also remains to be seen whether
they will withstand the legal challenges that are sure to come.
Assuming that an area qualifies as federal jurisdictional wetlands, the
Corps has authority to regulate discharges of dredge material.20
Dredge material is defined by the Corps regulations as "material
excavated from the waters of the United States." 1  Thus, in this
somewhat roundabout way, if wetlands are "waters of the United
States," then the wetlands vegetation and soil removed from them are
"dredged material" and subject to section 404 permit requirements.
But there is no direct statutory authority for the EMC to establish a
permit system like the Corps' for the discharge of dredged material.
The validity of the proposed rules depends, then, on whether the
requirement for a permit to discharge waste into waters of the state
encompasses discharges of dredged material in isolated wetlands.
Arguably it does not.
The large-scale mechanized landclearing operations that are the
target of the new Tulloch rule illustrate the potential defect in the
legal foundation for the proposed rules. These wetlands clearing
operations may take place at times when there is no water present in
the wetlands area. In such circumstances, the only "waste" being
discharged would be the wetlands soil and vegetation that would be
falling back into a seasonally dry wetlands. "Waste" is defined in the
relevant statute as "sewage," "industrial waste," and "other waste." 2
The first category, sewage, would not be applicable to such wetlands
248. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2H.1305(a), (c), & (d).
249. The membership of the thirteen-member commission is described in N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 143B-283 (1999). Nine seats were open for appointments as of July 1, 2001. See
Feagans, supra note 37.
250. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1301(a), 1344(a) (1994).
251. The CWA does not define the terms "dredge" or "fill" material. The term
"pollutant" is defined in 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1994) to include "dredged spoil, solid waste
... biological materials ... rock, sand." Dredge material, however, is defined in the Corps
regulations as "material that is excavated or dredged from the waters of the United
States." 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (2000).
252. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-213(18) (1999).
[Vol. 791718
NOW OPEN FOR DEVELOPMENT
discharges, but the other two categories might. "Industrial waste"
includes "any solid... or other waste substance ... resulting from...
the development of any natural resource. ' '1 53 This definition might
encompass wetlands soil and vegetation falling back into a wetlands
area. But this category seems directed at materials that are
byproducts of some industrial operation or process and not incidental
soil movements or almost simultaneous discharges of removed, but
unaltered, soil and vegetable matter back into the same environment
from which it was initially removed. The term "other waste" is
defined to include "sediment, and all other substances." Sediment is
generally defined as "matter that settles to the bottom of a liquid."254
Wetlands soil and vegetation falling back into the seasonally dry
wetlands area during a mechanized landclearing operation does not
satisfy this common understanding of the meaning of sediment. The
North Carolina Sedimentation Pollution Control Act of 197325
defines sediment as "solid particulate matter, both mineral and
organic, that has been or is being transported by water, air, gravity, or
ice from its site of origin 56 Wetlands soil and vegetation might
satisfy this definition of sediment, depending on how broadly or
narrowly "site of origin" is construed. But the words "particulate
matter" in the definition convey the idea of minute separate particles,
in a liquid medium, and not incidental fallback and other movement
of wetlands vegetation and soil in seasonably dry wetlands5
7
If that interpretation is correct, then such discharges must fall
within the catchall phrase "all other substances." The North Carolina
Attorney General's office gives a broad reading to both "other waste"
and "all other substances." In its September 5, 2001 advisory opinion
to the EMC, the Attorney General's office states that "waste" is
defined by statute as "refuse, sediment, and other fill materials."
258
Based on this interpretation, the opinion concludes that the EMC has
authority to regulate discharges of fill materials in isolated
wetlands.259 There are some difficulties with this interpretation,
however. There is no specific authority, for example, for the EMC to
253. Id. § 143-213(18)(b).
254. WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2054 (1993).
255. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-50 to -66 (1999).
256. Id. § 113A-52(10).
257. WEBSTER'S, supra note 254, at 1647.
258. Authority of the Environmental Management Commission to Adopt Temporary
and Permanent Rules Requiring Permits for Impacts to Isolated Wetlands and Surface
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regulate the discharge of "fill material" into the waters of the state.
The EMC was created to administer a "program of water ...
pollution control and water resource management. ''26° As part of the
administration of such a program, an EMC permit is required for the
discharges of "waste" in violation of state water quality standards.26'
The words "fill material" do not appear anywhere in the statutes
authorizing EMC activity. The definitional statute provides that
"[o]ther waste means sawdust, shavings, lime, refuse, offal, oil, tar,
chemicals, dissolved and suspended solids, sediment, and other
substances... which may be discharged into ... water."262 Thus, the
assumption underlying the Attorney General's opinion is that the
discharge of some of these specific substances into waters of the state
could be part of a filling activity and, therefore, any "other
substances" include any other material that might be used to fill a
waterway or waterbody. Some support for such an interpretation can
be found in the statute prohibiting obstructions of streams. That
statute makes it a misdemeanor to "put any slabs, stumpage, sawdust,
shavings, lime, refuse, or any other substance in any ... stream [or]
river." '263 Soil, vegetation, rocks, and sand that create obstructions of
such waters undoubtedly would be "other substances" within the
meaning of this statute.
But the meaning of "other waste" and "other substances" should
be read in light of the purpose of the particular statute of which they
are a part. The purpose of the stream obstruction statute is to keep
waterways open, whereas the purpose of the statute prohibiting
discharge of waste is to prevent pollution and protect the quality of
the waters of the state. In light of the specific substances classified as
"other waste," the nature question is whether the General Assembly
intended to include within the ambit of that phrase wetlands soil and
vegetation incidentally falling back into a seasonally dry wetlands or
being redeposited in such an area. Ultimately, the answer to that
question would appear to hinge on whether seasonally dry, isolated
wetlands are "waters of the state." If they are, then such substances,
benign on their face, may be viewed as the type of byproducts that,
when removed and reintroduced to the waters of the state, potentially
degrade those waters.26
260. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-211(c) (1999).
261. Id. § 143-215.1(a)(6).
262. Id. § 143-212(18).
263. Id. § 77-14.
264. In United States v. Deaton, 209 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 2000), the defendant engaged a
contractor to dig a drainage ditch through a wetlands area. As the contractor dug, he piled
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A final but not insignificant difficulty with the Attorney
General's approach is that it may not go far enough. In the Corps
regulations, fill material is defined as "any material used for the
primary purpose of replacing an aquatic area with dry land or of
changing the bottom elevation of a waterbody. ' '265 In the large-scale
Tulloch landclearing operations, the object of the project may be the
conversion of wetlands into dry land, but the incidental discharge of
wetlands soil and vegetation is not being done for the primary
purpose of replacing the wetlands with dry land or changing the
bottom elevation of the wetlands. The material being removed is
dredged material-material excavated from the wetlands266-and not
fill material. Therefore, even if the EMC has authority to require
permits for the discharge of fill material, not all discharges of
wetlands soil and vegetation constitute discharged of fill material.
F. Other Risks Associated with Ditching and Draining Wetlands
In addition to potential violations of existing water quality
standards, attempts to ditch or drain isolated wetlands in North
Carolina pose other legal risks. After the National Mining decision,
and the rush to ditch and drain wetlands in Eastern North Carolina,
267
developers and other property owners subsequently discovered their
activities violated other federal and state regulations. Although
ditching and draining that involved only incidental discharges were
permissible after National Mining, the methods used by developers
the excavated dirt on either side of the ditch, a practice known as sidecasting. The
defendant argued that the CWA did not prohibit this activity because it prohibited
"addition of any pollutant," not simply the "addition of material." According to the
defendant, "addition" meant the adding of something not previously present. The court,
however, determined that sidecasting, without a section 404 permit, was a violation of the
CWA. The court reasoned that "there could be an addition of a pollutant with an addition
of material ... at least when an activity transforms some material from a nonpollutant into
a pollutant." Id. at 335. "Congress determined," the court continued, "that plain dirt,
once excavated from waters of the United States, could not be redeposited into those
waters without causing some harm to the environment." Id. at 336. Using somewhat
similar reasoning, one might argue that the General Assembly made a similar
determination when it required a permit for the discharge of any waste into the waters of
the State. On the other hand, a major difference between the CWA and the North
Carolina statutes is that the CWA specifically designates benign substances such as rock,
sand, cellar dirt, and biological materials as pollutants. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1994).
265. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e) (2000). Since the proposed new EMC rules respond to the
possible loss of Corps section 404 jurisdiction over isolated wetlands and use the terms
"dredge" and "fill material," the assumption is that the EMC intends those terms to have a
meaning similar to that which appears in the Corps' regulations.
266. See 33 C.F.R. 323.2(c) (2000).
267. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
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and other property owners went beyond incidental discharges and
constituted violations of valid section 404 dredge and fill
regulations.268  In addition, even though the DWQ did not
immediately step in and enforce its water quality regulations,
269
developers and other property owners discovered that their activities
violated the state Sedimentation Pollution Control Act. 70 The end
result was subsequent federal and state enforcement and the refilling
of ditches, restoring of wetlands hydrology, and payment of
substantial fines.271
CONCLUSION
The recent developments in wetland litigation may refocus
attention on the nature of the Clean Water Act and determine
whether the Act will continue to be applied to protect and preserve
the nation's wetlands resources. While a narrow interpretation of
"incidental discharge" may limit dredge and fill activities in isolated
freshwater wetlands, this may not matter as much after the SWANCC
decision. To some degree, SWANCC affects the geographic scope of
section 404. Although the impact of this change in federal law is
uncertain because accurate estimates of the wetland resources
affected are not possible,272 the decision in SWANCC is potentially
devastating to our nation's efforts to protect both water quality and
migratory birds.
In the southeast, certain important and unique wetlands found
along the Atlantic coastal plain, including Carolina Bays and
pocosins, many of which are isolated, non-navigable, intrastate
freshwater wetlands, may not qualify as "waters of the United
States." These wetland areas provide habitat for waterfowl and
268. See, e.g., Regulators Going After Developers, supra note 168.
269. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
270. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-50 to -67 (1999); see, e.g., Shiffer, Loophole, supra note
168; Shiffer, State Takes Strict Action, supra note 216. These enforcement actions were
taken by the state Division of Land Resources. Any landclearing activity of more than
one acre requires the approval of an erosion control plan and compliance with the plan.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-57 (1999). Even if the clearing involves less than one acre, if
sediment leaves the site, that is violation of the act and subjects the violator to
enforcement action. Poyner & Spruill, L.L.P., supra note 236, at 1.
271. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
272. With so much continuing uncertainty as to the meaning of "waters of the United
States" and uncertainty as to which non-404 jurisdictional wetlands will still be subject to
regulation under state laws and what limitations on activities in non-404 jurisdictional
wetlands exist, the estimate of the range of wetlands affected by the SWANCC decision is
broad. National estimates of the affected wetlands range from thirty to seventy-nine
percent of the nation's wetlands acreage. Kunsler, supra note 30, at 9.
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terrestrial animals. In addition, wetlands known as mountain bogs
would likely be excluded from section 404 jurisdiction. These
freshwater wetlands are located throughout the Appalachian
Mountains and provide habitat for numerous animals, including
several rare amphibian species 3
Although the State continues to regulate some activities that
threaten these important natural resources, developers and other
property owners continue to question whether that power exists
under current North Carolina law. Whether the State may continue
to apply its water quality standards to restrict the ditching and
draining of wetlands depends on the interpretation of state statutes
and ambiguous EMC regulations. Hopefully, public interest in
protecting all water resources will be the guiding principle in that
task. However, if it is determined that some isolated freshwater
wetlands are not waters of the State of North Carolina, then it is
imperative that the legislature and the EMC act to close this
loophole. Otherwise history tells us that, lacking both federal and
state protection, it is likely that the state, and the nation, will
experience an onslaught of destructive development activities in such
unprotected wetlands. 4
273. In other areas of the country, perhaps the most significant wetlands that could be
excluded from section 404 jurisdiction are prairie potholes in the Midwest. Prairie
potholes are small, freshwater wetlands that were formed by glaciers. An estimated fifty
to seventy-five percent of all waterfowl in North America depend on these wetlands for
habitat.
274. This is evidenced by what happened in 1998 in North Carolina. See supra note 168
and accompanying text.
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